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Internal Jus ad Bellum
Eliav Lieblich*
In 1945, the United Nations Charter famously set out “to save succeeding generations
from the scourge of war.” Having in mind traditional interstate wars, the Charter’s
Article 2(4) outlawed, for the first time, interstate uses of force. However, nowadays,
international wars are relatively rare, while civil wars are both more numerous and
increasingly destructive. Still, international law has yet to develop a regime regulating the
resort to war (jus ad bellum) within a state, either by governments or opposition groups.
Contemporary jus ad bellum, thus, fails to address one of the most atrocious forms of
war in the modern international system.
This Article puts forward a novel theory of internal jus ad bellum, equally applicable to
governments as well as opposition groups. It demonstrates that the current blind spot in
international law concerning this issue is incoherent and unwarranted. By applying the
revisionist approach to just war theory, this Article argues that internal resort to armed
force can only be morally acceptable if undertaken in self (or other) defense against grave
threats.
Applying this notion to the international legal sphere, this Article claims that collectivist
doctrines such as self-determination, sovereignty, or democratic entitlement are not
appropriate venues for an acceptable standard of internal jus ad bellum. It proceeds to
locate such a possible standard in international human rights law (“IHRL”), which
enshrines everyone’s right to life. However, as the Article demonstrates, IHRL, as
currently understood, fails to serve as an effective framework for internal jus ad bellum,
since it collapses, during armed conflict, into international humanitarian law. The Article
concludes by suggesting an understanding of IHRL that can overcome these limitations
and thus serve as a working doctrine of internal jus ad bellum.

* Assistant Professor, Radzyner Law School, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya. J.S.D.,
Columbia Law School. I wish to thank Eyal Benvenisti, Janina Dill, and Adam Shinar for the helpful
comments and discussions, and the editors at Hastings Law Journal for their diligent work.
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Introduction
In 1945, the United Nations (“U.N.”) Charter famously set out “to
1
save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” Undoubtedly, the
Charter’s framers had in mind, when phrasing this ambitious goal, the
two World Wars that have brought “untold sorrow to mankind” during
2
the twentieth century. Accordingly, the Charter’s Article 2(4) laid down
the first comprehensive legal prohibition on the interstate use of force,
providing that “[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations
3
from the threat or use of force against . . . any state[.]”
However, nowadays, interstate wars are by no means the main cause
of the human suffering that the framers wished to prevent. Of the 254
armed conflicts recorded between 1946 and 2013 by a leading database,
only twenty-four have been categorized as interstate conflicts, while a
4
staggering number of 153 intrastate conflicts were recorded. Civil wars
are not only more numerous, but are also extremely violent, intractable,
and often accompanied by mass atrocities. In Syria, for instance, as of
late 2015, the U.N. estimated that over 200,000 people have died in
almost five years of strife, with no end in sight. In Europe and across the
Middle East, the Syrian civil war accounts for one of the worst refugee
5
crises in recent history.
Yet, seventy years after the conclusion of the U.N. Charter,
mainstream international legal doctrine still remains awkwardly silent
regarding the decision to resort to force within state borders—whether
6
by governments or opposition groups. Oddly, this has been the case
although international law has made significant strides, in the past
7
decades, into issues long considered strictly matters of internal affairs.
Indeed, the U.N. Charter itself reflects a compromise between idealism
and post-war realism: during its formation, utopian visions of a
cosmopolitan world order were reconciled with enduring notions of state
8
sovereignty. The significant achievement of Article 2(4) was thus not

1. U.N. Charter pmbl.
2. Id.
3. Id. art. 2(4) (emphasis added).
4. The rest were mixed conflicts. See World Map, Uppsala Conflict Data Program,
www.ucdp.uu.se/database (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
5. About the Crisis, OCHA, http://www.unocha.org/syrian-arab-republic/syria-countryprofile/about-crisis (last visited Apr. 10, 2016); Ariane Rummery, Worsening Conditions Inside Syria
and the Region Fuel Despair, Driving Thousands Towards Europe, UNHCR News Stories (Sept. 8,
2015), http://www.unhcr.org/55eed5d66.html.
6. The same awkwardness is found in the study of the ethics of war. See Cécile Fabre,
Cosmopolitan War 131 (2012).
7. Namely, through the growth of international human rights law. For a comprehensive
overview, see Philip Alston & Ryan Goodman, International Human Rights (2013).
8. See Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History 45–46 (2010).
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extended to internal resorts to force, leaving intact the pre-Charter legal
regime on the issue.
Pre-Charter law, being statist and sovereignty-centered, assumed
freedom of action within state borders, even concerning decisions to
resort to force. The general norm of nonintervention in internal affairs,
supplemented by the perception that international law cannot regulate
actions by individuals, resulted in the view that both governments, when
asserting their sovereignty, and individuals, when embarking on
rebellion, were free to resort to force. Since the U.N. Charter did not
alter this approach, the question of intrastate resort to force—or internal
jus ad bellum—remained a “blank spot” of international law throughout
9
the post-war legal order. Surprisingly, the vast majority of international
legal discourse—usually keen on expanding the reach of international
law—proved consistently deferential in this context. In 1947, Hersch
Lauterpacht wrote that internal jus ad bellum was a matter for future
10
development. Sixty-seven years later, Yoram Dinstein still concedes
that international law’s silence on internal resorts to force remains the
11
“indisputable, albeit grim, reality.” Indeed, virtually all of the writing on
jus ad bellum and internal strife, throughout the years, tended to focus on
the question of intervention, meaning, the extent to which external parties
may support this or that party, and not on the resort to force by the
12
internal parties themselves.
International legal discourse thus refrains from addressing the
legality of the decision to resort to internal force, although civil wars are
the worst form of mass violence in the contemporary international
system. This Article argues that this cannot be justified either in
jurisprudential terms or in terms of policy. As it demonstrates, the

9. See Inger Österdahl, The Gentle Modernizer of the Law of Armed Conflict?, in JUS POST
BELLUM: Mapping the Normative Foundations 207, 227 (Carsten Stahn et al. eds., 2014).
10. Hersch Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law 93 (1947).
11. Yoram Dinstein, Non-International Armed Conflicts in International Law 5 (2014); see
also Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion 997, I.C.J. 141, ¶ 80 (July 22, 2010) [hereinafter Kosovo Advisory
Opinion]; Olivier Corten, The Russian Intervention in the Ukrainian Crises: Was Jus Contra Bellum
Confirmed Rather than Weakened?, 2 J. Use Force & Int’l L. 17 n.43 (2015) (arguing that Article 2(4)
has not been extended to the internal realm, and although some governmental resort to force is
condemned, this simply reflects expansion of Security Council powers and not a primary prohibition;
arguing that international law does not prohibit resort to force by opposition groups); see also Claus
Kress, Major Post-Westphalian Shifts and Some Important Neo-Westphalian Hesitations in the State
Practice on the International Law on the Use of Force, 1 J. Use Force & Int’l L. 11, 13–14, 25, 41–42,
51–52 (2014). But see Kirsti Samuels, Jus ad Bellum and Civil Conflicts: A Case Study of the
International Community’s Approach to Violence in the Conflict in Sierra Leone, 8 J. Conf. & Sec. L.
315 (2003) (arguing that international practice concerning the conflict in Sierra Leone might
foreshadow emerging norms of jus ad bellum in “civil conflicts”).
12. Countless works focus mainly on intervention. See, e.g., Humanitarian Intervention:
Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas (J. L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane eds., 2003); The
International Law of Civil War (Richard A. Falk ed., 1971).
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current legal situation, in which external use of force is regulated under
the U.N. Charter while internal resort to force remains in legal limbo, is a
peculiar moment in the history of international legal theory. It undercuts
the coherence of the international legal system and thus also its
legitimacy.
This Article therefore attempts to break the deadlock on internal
force by suggesting a theory that can be ethically justified; is equally
applicable to both governments and opposition groups; and can be
grounded in reasonable interpretation of existing legal standards. The
basic argument is that internal resorts to full-fledged hostilities—whether
by governments or opposition groups—are generally prohibited, and can
only be undertaken in self-defense or in defense of others against a
threat to life or limb, of the scale and effect that usually emanates only
from a prior resort to armed hostilities. Should this theory be accepted, it
could usher in a new sphere of legal responsibility, not only for violations
of international humanitarian law (“IHL”) during internal armed
conflicts, but also for the mere resort to armed force within state borders.
This Article locates the theoretical grounds for such a rule in
revisionist just war theory. As detailed later on, revisionist just war
theory is a school in the study of the ethics of war, which proceeds from
the basic proposition that all acts of killing—whether individual or
collective—are subjected to the same morality. Revisionists first make
the widely accepted claim that individuals are permitted to kill only in
defense of self or others (“self-or-other-defense”) from grave threats,
subject to necessity and proportionality limitations. They then move to
make the radical (yet still intuitive) claim that individuals cannot shake
off these limitations simply by acting through a collective, such as by the
13
“people” or even the “state.”
Applying this reasoning to international legal concepts reveals that a
morally coherent standard on internal resort to force must conform to
three mutually complementing rules. First, it cannot presume that
different morality governs collective action versus individual action,
which must result in similar standards for governments, peoples, and
individuals. Second, since resort to force is about killing, it cannot be
more permissive than the self-or-other-defense standard. Third, a
standard on the internal resort to force cannot conflate the right to
something (such as sovereignty, self-determination, or democracy) with
the right to use armed violence—essentially, to kill—to achieve it.
After laying down the ethical point of departure described above,
this Article locates the legal grounding for such self-or-other-defense
rule in the right to life, as enshrined in positive international human

13. For a short overview of the debate, see Cécile Fabre & Seth Lazar, Introduction, in The
Morality of Defensive War 1–3 (Cécile Fabre & Seth Lazar eds., 2014).
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rights law (“IHRL”). The right to life is a proper venue for the regulation
of internal resorts to force since IHRL, in general, deals with intrastate
relations. In this context, the right to life sets out to protect the lives of
everyone affected by a decision to employ armed force: soldiers,
members of opposition groups, or civilians likely to get caught in the
crossfire. By regulating this decision, the right to life can serve as a
complementing defense even for persons that might lawfully lose their
lives under the law of armed conflict, if a decision to resort to force is
made. To emphasize the point further, since the question of resort to
force deals with the mere decision to embark on hostilities, it is distinct
from the manner in which the hostilities are actually conducted (jus in
bello). The right to life, if understood as a prohibition on internal resort
to force, can therefore add an additional layer of legal analysis, even if
the forcible acts themselves are conducted lawfully under jus in bello.
However, as this Article demonstrates, the current understanding of
IHRL requires significant development in order for this task to be
fulfilled.
This Article does not presume to outline each and every aspect of
the prohibition on internal force and its self-defense exception. A myriad
of questions can be asked: How do we define an “armed attack” on the
internal level, considering that it is often difficult to identify the relevant
actors, operating in informal frameworks? Should the concept of
anticipatory self-defense apply in internal settings? What role, if any,
should be reserved for collective self-defense in the internal sphere?
What part would the U.N. Security Council play? Should the strict
separation between jus ad bellum and jus in bello—still the prevalent
view concerning international uses of force—be maintained in the
internal realm? How well positioned is the international community in
assessing internal resorts to force? When referring to nonstate actors,
should their actions be assessed according to individual or collective,
corporate-like responsibility? Such questions are all important and merit
further study. This Article, however, aims to set the general baseline for
the assessment of internal resort to force, hopefully sparking further
discussion of this long, averted issue.
Before moving on, some distinctions are required to clarify the
boundaries of our discussion. Mainly, we need to define the meaning of
“resort to force,” to which the suggested prohibition applies. Indeed, the
power to coerce in a defined territory is a basic tenet of sovereignty, to
14
some even its defining element. Coercion, of course, implies a wide
14. See, e.g., Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in The Vocation Lectures 32, 33 (David Owen
& Tracy B. Strong eds., Rodney Livingstone trans., 2004) (stating famously that “the state is the form
of human community that (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate physical violence
within a particular territory”); see also Lassa Oppenheim, 1 International Law: A Treatise § 123 (2d
ed. 1912) (defining sovereignty as “supreme authority”).
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spectrum of actions. Obviously, some level of coercion is a given within a
state, not every form of which could possibly amount to a prohibited use
of force. For instance, the use of law enforcement agencies and
adjudicatory bodies for securing the public interest is not the type of
force envisioned here. Chiefly, this is because coercive force in the form
of law enforcement does not usually entail intentional killing, but only
the use of physical force necessary for the arrest and trial of a suspected
individual. When lethal force is undertaken during a law enforcement
action, it is only as a last resort, in defense against a specific, imminent
threat. Importantly, that threat is assessed individually, and would result
15
in a permission to kill in very narrow circumstances. Citizens, too, may
in fact engage in what could be described as coercion against the state.
Such actions can consist of wide-scale, nonviolent civil resistance, which
16
might diminish the state’s capacity to act; or of demonstrations that
involve some level of random violence, which occasionally occur in even
17
the most stable of democracies. Just as this Article does not deal with
every form of state coercion, it is not concerned with all forms of citizeninduced coercion.
When discussing internal resorts to force, this Article refers only to
coercive power in the form of hostilities, whether undertaken by
governments or opposition groups. It also excludes all other “nonforcible” coercive actions, such as those routinely undertaken by states in
the context of law enforcement action, or by citizens in nonviolent
resistance or random rioting. Hostilities, as a matter of fact, differ from
“regular” coercive acts in several aspects. Namely, during hostilities,
persons are lethally attacked in light of their status or function, and not
necessarily in light of an imminently materializing threat. Further, the
degree and type of force used in hostilities is not subjected to a use-of18
force continuum, and, in general, arrest is not attempted prior to attack.
Coercive power is employed without previous adjudication, and

15. See Eliav Lieblich, Quasi-Hostile Acts: The Limits on Forcible Disruption Operations Under
International Law, 32 B.U. Int’l L.J. 355, 365–70 (2014) (outlining the law enforcement paradigm).
16. See, e.g., M. K. Gandhi, Non-Violent Resistance (1961); Gene Sharp, The Meanings of NonViolence: A Typology, 3 Conf. Resol. 41, 42 (1959).
17. See, e.g., Carl-Ulrik Schierup & Aleksandra Ålund, The End of Swedish Exceptionalism?
Citizenship, Neoliberalism and the Politics of Exclusion, 53 Race & Class 45 (2011).
18. I reserve the question whether there is also a legal obligation to capture rather than kill during
hostilities. See, e.g., HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov’t of Isr. 62(1) PD 507 ¶ 40
[2006] (Isr.); Nils Melzer, Int’l Comm. Red Cross, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct
Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law 77 (2009); Gabriella Blum,
The Dispensable Lives of Soldiers, 2 J. Legal Analysis 69, 115 (2010); Ryan Goodman, The Power to
Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants, 24 Eur. J. Int’l L. 819 (2013). But see W. Hays Parks, Part IX of
the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect,
42 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 769, 799–812 (2010).
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proportionate incidental harm to uninvolved civilians is tolerated.
When violence is undertaken by nonstate actors, a factual threshold of
intensity, protraction, and organization must be crossed, in order for the
acts to constitute hostilities—as opposed to “regular” acts of violence
20
associated with “normal” criminal activity. The focus on hostilities, as
opposed to other forms of coercion, can be justified on two main counts.
First, the resort to coercive force short of hostilities is relatively well21
regulated under human rights law. Second, since the resort to hostilities
is about intentional killing, it differs morally from any other form of
coercion. Obviously, it is the most detrimental to human life and security.
A further distinction must be made. Sometimes, citizen coercion can
result in regime change. This could be achieved either through an extraconstitutional revolution, or by a coercive removal of a government in
22
circumstances permitted under the state’s own constitutional order. The
legality of such outcomes, in international law, is all too often conflated
with the lawfulness of force employed to achieve them. Lauterpacht, for
instance, argued that as long as international law does not prohibit
revolutions “it cannot condemn the means, necessarily violent, by which
23
they are achieved.” However, this is a fundamental mistake, since it
obfuscates objectives and means. Overthrowing a government can be an
24
outcome of civil unrest, but it does not necessarily require the use of
25
armed force. In legal terms, thus, it is perfectly possible that in certain

19. See Lieblich, supra note 15, at 366; see also Jens David Ohlin, Acting as a Sovereign Versus Acting as
a Belligerent 11–15 (Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 14–21, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2456754 (providing a theoretical distinction between situations in which
states act as “sovereigns” and as “belligerents”).
20. The widely accepted definition of “armed conflict” espoused by the International Criminal
Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) is helpful in this context. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case
No. IT-94-1-I, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2,
1995) (holding that “an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States
or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or
between such groups within a state”); see also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol II) art. 1(1), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, art. 1(2) [hereinafter Protocol II] (excluding
from the definition of armed conflict “situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots,
isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts”).
21. See, e.g., Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials
arts. 6, 9, 10, 12, 15, 18, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 (Sept. 7, 1990) [hereinafter Basic Principles];
McCann v. U.K., 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. 97 ¶¶ 146–50 (1995).
22. Tom Ginsburg et al., When to Overthrow Your Government: The Right to Resist in the World’s
Constitutions, 60 UCLA L. Rev. 1184, 1193 (2013).
23. Lauterpacht, supra note 10, at 107.
24. See Ted Gurr, Psychological Factors in Civil Violence, 20 World Pol. 245, 246 (1968)
(“[R]evolutions are but one of an extraordinarily numerous variety of interrelated forms of strife.”).
25. See Jack A. Goldstone, Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory, 4 Ann. Rev.
Pol. Sci. 139, 142 (2001); Walter Benjamin, Critique of Violence, in Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms,
Autobiographical Writings 277, 277–78 (Peter Demetz ed., Edmund Jephcott trans., 1986) (noting a
common problem in certain legal philosophies in which violence is always viewed as justified when
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circumstances, revolution, as an outcome, would be permitted, but resort
to hostilities to achieve it would not. Analytically speaking, therefore, the
legality of revolutions and the measures that bring them about should be
discussed separately.
The Article is structured as follows. Part I offers historical context
for the current international legal discourse concerning internal resorts
to force. As it demonstrates, in the legal order established by the U.N.
Charter, the law concerning external and internal resorts to force became
divergent: for the first time, external resort to force was legally regulated,
while internal force remained beyond the reach of law. The Part criticizes
this doctrinal divergence as a peculiar and incoherent moment in
international legal history.
Part II introduces revisionist just war theory as a possible ethical
framework to inform the construction of a legal doctrine concerning
internal resorts to force. This framework rejects collectivist justifications
for killing and suggests the right of self-or-other-defense as the proper
baseline for the assessment of internal jus ad bellum.
Part III discusses several possible “collective” visions for internal jus
ad bellum and proceeds to demonstrate that these are unsatisfactory. It
shows that self-determination, sovereignty, territorial integrity, or
democratic legitimacy are in themselves insufficient as proper justifications
for killing—unless we adopt a collectivist (and thus wrong) view of
permissions to kill. This Part discusses other specific shortcomings of these
possible frameworks.
Part IV suggests IHRL, and in particular the right to life, as a proper
international legal basis for both the prohibition on the internal resort to
hostilities and its exceptions. However, it also demonstrates that positive
IHRL, as currently applied in leading judicial decisions, is not developed
enough to support a workable doctrine of internal jus ad bellum. In
particular, this Part highlights that in practice, once an internal armed
conflict erupts, the right to life collapses into IHL, which severely limits
IHRL’s potential to regulate the resort to force itself. International legal
discourse is thus preoccupied with the question of whether an “armed
conflict” exists, as a proxy for jus ad bellum questions. This interaction
between IHRL and IHL replicates the pre-Charter relations between the
law of “peace” and the law of “war,” which assumed that sovereigns had
a prerogative to move freely between these realms. The Part then
proceeds to demonstrate why this situation is unsatisfactory: chiefly, it

undertaken for seemingly just ends); see also Aristotle, The Politics 198 (Benjamin Jowett trans.,
1908) (noting that “[r]evolutions are effected in two ways, by force and by fraud”). A recent example
for an outcome of revolution without use of armed force is the 2011 “Jasmine Revolution” in Tunisia.
See generally Nouri Gana, Introduction: Collaborative Revolutionism, in The Making of the Tunisian
Revolution: Contexts, Architects, Prospects (Nouri Gana ed., 2013) (providing a backdrop and
history behind the Tunisian revolution).
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results in a circular situation in which the factual existence of an armed
conflict becomes a normative justification for the resort to hostilities.
Part V presents a preliminary working doctrine of internal jus ad
bellum, which branches out from the right to life, but which refrains from
collapsing into IHL once hostilities commence. It argues that the right to
life should be read as a prohibition on the first resort to internal
hostilities, qualified only by a right to self-and-other-defense, and subject
to necessity and proportionality requirements. It further posits that such
a standard can and should be applied to governments, but also to
nonstate actors. Finally, the Part maintains that although, in general,
similar standards of resort to force apply to governments and opposition
groups, it is possible to envision a system of factual presumptions to
provide some flexibility in the application of this rule.
I. External and Internal JUS AD BELLUM in International Law
The modern law on jus ad bellum can best be described as reflecting
an uneasy doctrinal split, signifying a peculiar moment in the history of
international law. This Part surveys how this divergence came to be, from
the pioneering era of international law until today’s post-U.N. Charter
legal order, and offers a critique of the current understanding of the law.
A. Positive Unification: Natural Law Regulating All Realms of
Force
The roots of modern international law lie in natural law thought, its
26
basic premise being that morality determines law’s validity and content.
Natural law, of course, could not be blind to internal resorts to force:
since it was based on universal truths applicable to all spheres of human
activity, natural law covered both external and internal uses of force,
whether by rulers or subjects. As every sovereign conduct could be
assessed in light of laws derived from morality, and because natural law
27
bound kings as well as individuals, there was no reason to a priori
exclude internal wars from the moral legal discourse.
The ruling natural law framework for the assessment of resort to
force was provided by traditional just war theory. An amalgamation of
Greco-Roman and Catholic ideas going back to authorities such as

26. See Stephen C. Neff, Justice Among Nations: A History of International Law ch. 2 (2014).
27. See id. at 163 (noting that “natural law was applicable to kings, as well as to ordinary
people”). This perception was rooted in the late-medieval jus commune. See Randal Lesaffer, The
Nature and Sources of Europe’s Classical Law of Nations 6 (June 25, 2015) (unpublished manuscript,
Tilburg University), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2623086 (“Canon and Roman
law [jus commune] embodied the ideal of divine justice and translated it into myriads of concrete rules
. . . Princes and rulers, as well as any common man, were equally subject to their commands.”).
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28

Aristotle, Cicero, Augustine, and Aquinas, just war theory outlined
29
conditions for a resort to war to be morally just. War, to be just, had to
fulfill several well-known criteria: just cause, right intention, proper
30
authority, last resort, probability of success and proportionality.
Now, it remains debatable whether classic just war criteria were
meant to be applied as such to internal wars. Some commentators argue
31
that the theory did not at all constrain internal resort to force by rulers.
Regarding resort to force by subjects, conversely, the precondition that a
just war could only be conducted by a proper (or legitimate) authority—
32
meaning, by the sovereign—served as the most significant barrier.
Nonetheless, it would be imprecise to say that “law” was silent on
internal resorts to force, although it did not address them in just war
33
language. It would be more accurate to say that such law in fact existed,
but was simply heavily skewed in favor of rulers. Indeed, Catholic
doctrine explicitly condoned internal force by rulers without clear
restrictions. This outcome was justified on moral grounds: the ruler, after
34
all, was “God’s minister.” Additionally, if the ruler represents the deity,
and the deity is of course just, it is only a logical result that subjects could
35
never undertake a just war against him. To Augustine, thus, “rebellion”
36
was an evil motive per se and, as such, a true sin.
But what if the sovereign unjustly threatened the lives of its
subjects? Although Catholic doctrine recognized self-defense as a natural
right, it could not be understood as such to justify hostilities against the

28. See John Eppstein, The Catholic Tradition of the Law of Nations 65–68 (1935); Brian
Orend, War, Stan. Encyclopedia of Phil. (July 28, 2005), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/war/.
29. In ancient Rome, for instance, a regular procedure was even laid down in which
“independent” priests, known as fetials, would determine, even if only symbolically, the justness of this
or that decision to wage war. See Neff, supra note 26, at 32–33.
30. Orend, supra note 28.
31. James Turner Johnson, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and
Historical Inquiry 49–59 (1981).
32. Augustine, Against Faustus bk. XII, ch. LXXV, reprinted in Eppstein, supra note 28, at 69–70;
Thomas Aquinas, Question 40: War, Summa Theologica, http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3040.htm
(last visited Apr. 10, 2016) (“[I]t is not the business of a private individual to declare war,” and
conversely, it is the business of “those in authority . . . to have recourse to the sword . . . against
internal disturbances.”).
33. See Fabre, supra note 6, at 131 (arguing that in fact, just war theory is relevant to internal as
well as external conflicts).
34. Aquinas, supra note 32.
35. See Francisco de Vitoria, On Civil Power § 10, in Vitoria: Political Writings 3, 18–19
(Anthony Pagden & Jeremy Lawrance eds., 1991) (“[P]ublic power is of God . . . as such it is just and
legitimate . . . .”). Indeed, this understanding led, for instance, the Austrian Episcopate, to declare—as
late as 1933—after the rise of the totalitarian Dollfuss regime—that since the state is the
“representative of God,” “[r]evolution and any attempt to upset authority by force are condemned.”
Contemporary Errors Relating to the Totalitarian Nation-State, Letter of the Austrian Episcopate,
Vienna (Dec. 21, 1933), reprinted in Eppstein, supra note 28, at 375.
36. Augustine, supra note 32, at 84.
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37

sovereign. Employing the famous doctrine of double effect, Aquinas
recognized the lawfulness of killing in self-defense, but only when the
38
intention was to save one’s own life rather than killing the aggressor.
Conversely, acting with an intention to kill—such “as in the case of a
soldier fighting against the foe”—could only be justified if performed for
39
the public good, a task strictly entrusted to the sovereign. Thus, even if
individuals could act in individual self-defense, resort to hostilities, as
commonly understood, was beyond what natural law allowed them.
The explicit idea of a (limited) right of organized resistance came
about only with the Reformation of the sixteenth century. At first,
Calvin’s teachings followed the old Christian doctrine of “turning the
other cheek,” by implying that Christian subjects must respond to
40
However, after the St.
persecution by prayer and patience.
41
Bartholomew Massacre of 1582, a major reconstruction of Reformist
“resistance theory” was needed. The emerging framework for such
theory was through the idea of the social contract, the breach of which
42
would entail some right of resistance. Simply put, such theories
presumed a tri-partite contract between God, the ruler, and the people,
requiring obedience to the laws of God and nature in return, so to speak,
for divine protection. If the ruler violated the contract by becoming a
43
tyrant, active resistance was permitted, even by warfare. However, even
in such cases, the right to resist was not granted to private individuals,
but rather to public representatives (lesser magistrates), who would be
44
charged with conducting orderly resistance.
These ideas were further developed by the post-Westphalian
pioneers of international law, such as Grotius, Pufendorf, and later on
Vattel, who attempted to deduce a coherent system of international legal
45
norms from principles of natural law. In terms of internal use of force,
these thinkers adopted a conciliatory stance, in which obedience remains

37. Cf. Neff, supra note 26, at 70 (noting that right to self-defense was available to ordinary
subjects against superiors, but was narrowly confined to warding off attacks).
38. Thomas Aquinas, Question 64: Murder, Summa Theologica art. 7, http://www.newadvent.org/
summa/3040.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
39. Id. (“[I]t is not lawful for a man to intend killing a man in self-defense, except for such as have
public authority, who while intending to kill a man in self-defense, refer this to the public good, as in
the case of a soldier fighting against the foe.”). For the same reasons, private individuals were
prohibited from killing sinners, since “the care of the common good is entrusted to . . . public
authority.” Id. art. 3.
40. See John Witte, Jr., The Reformation of Rights: Law, Religion and Human Rights in
Early Modern Calvinism 85 (2007).
41. The massacre was ordered by King Charles against French Calvinists. Id. at 84–87.
42. Id. at 86.
43. Id. at 84–87, 105, 115.
44. Id.
45. For a historical overview of the transformation of natural law into “international” law, see
Neff, supra note 26, chs. 3–4.
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the nearly absolute norm, yet some form of rightful resistance was
46
recognized. Like natural law thinkers before them, early international
lawyers took for granted, or at least did not categorically reject, the
power of sovereigns to resort to internal armed force (a “mixed” public47
private war, in Grotius’ terms). However, social-contractarian thought
delineated, to some extent, this right to use force, implying that
sovereigns must use force only within the confines of the social contract.
To Vattel, for instance, as long as the prince acted for the public good—
48
as required by the contract he was perfectly justified to use
49
proportional force to quell “unjust” rebels.
Nonetheless, even to the social-contractarian pioneers of international
law, the right to use force for the “public good” was not granted as such to
50
subjects. Citizens generally owed a “duty of nonresistance” to the
sovereign. Thus, to Grotius, even if ordered to act contrary to the law of
nature or the “Commands of God,” subjects could at most practice
51
disobedience, but could not actively resist by force. Being a rationalist,
Grotius justified this rule mainly through consequentialist reasoning: a too
“promiscuous” right to resist would destroy the state, and even an unjust
52
state is preferable, from the point of view of the citizen, to no state at all.
However, the obligation of nonresistance could not be absolute if natural
law was to remain coherent: a total obligation to submit would be
tantamount to suicide. Thus, early international lawyers recognized a
cautious and muffled right of internal self-defense. As Grotius conceded,
53
resistance might be justified in case of “extreme and inevitable danger,”
54
when the threat was undeniable or when the sovereign assaults first.
46. To Kant, their modest attempts at constraining power, which could always be used to justify
any attack, earned Grotius, Pufendorf, and Vattel the unflattering label “miserable comforters.”
Martti Koskenniemi, Miserable Comforters: International Relations as New Natural Law, 15 Eur. J.
Int’l Rel. 395, 411–12 (2009); see also Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace § II (1795).
47. Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace bk. III ch. 3, § 1, ch. 4 §§ 1–2 (Richard Tuck
ed., 2005).
48. Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations ch. IV, §§ 38–39 (Béla Kapossy & Richard Whatmore
eds., 2008).
49. Id. ch. XVIII, §§ 287–90.
50. This is despite the fact that Grotius, for instance, embraced the idea of “private war,” but not
by peoples against sovereigns. See Grotius, supra note 47.
51. Id. at 337–38.
52. Id. at 346–47. This consequentialist reasoning was common. See Samuel Pufendorf, Of the
Law of Nature and Nations 716 (Basil Kennett trans., 1729). This was also the view of Hobbes, to
whom the return to the state of nature and civil war was deemed worse than any suffering possibly
caused by the sovereign. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ch. XVIII (1651) (“[T]he greatest that in any
form of government can possibly happen to the people in general is scarce sensible, in respect of the
miseries and horrible calamities that accompany a civil war, or that dissolute condition of masterless
men without subjection to laws.”).
53. Grotius, supra note 47, at 356–57.
54. Id. at 359 (“David did not do this [gathered armed men to defend himself] till he was assured
. . . [by] many infallible Proofs, that Saul really sought his Life.”); see also id. at 360 (noting that the
Maccabees, like David, did not use their arms “unless first assaulted”).
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Pufendorf also recognized—albeit with visible reluctance—that “upon
the approach of extreme danger” subjects could take up arms strictly for
55
self-defense. Similarly, to Vattel, when a prince “attacks the
constitution of the state” the social contract is broken and resistance is
56
justified,” but he nevertheless stressed that the scope and nature of the
57
response depended on the gravity of the prince’s violation.
Thus, the early roots of international law, derived from the law of
nature and social-contractarianism, explicitly addressed both external
and internal uses of force. As such, early international legal thought was
coherent: it reflected a positive unification of legal doctrine, in the sense
that both realms of force were not perceived as beyond any form of legal
judgment.
B. From Negative Unification to Doctrinal Divergence
The positive unification of external and internal uses of force did
not survive, however, the decline of natural law theory. Throughout the
nineteenth century, naturalist thinking in international law gradually
weakened, as international legal positivism reached its pinnacle of
58
influence in the turn of the century. Responding, to a major extent, to
59
Austin’s famous critique of international “law” as mere morality,
international legal positivism was mostly concerned with pinpointing the
“sources” of binding international norms. In its most common form, it
asserted that in absence of accepted notions of “natural law,” there could
60
be no binding law beyond the explicit or tacit consent of states.
International legal positivism was augmented by two complementing,
longstanding processes of the Westphalian order: (1) the weakening of
the authority of the church, and (2) the consolidation of the secular state

55. Pufendorf, supra note 52, at 721–23.
56. Vattel, supra note 48, ch. IV, § 51.
57. Id. at 105–06 (distinguishing between a situation in which the ruler “violates the fundamental
laws” in which resistance is permissible but the person of the sovereign must be spared, and situations
in which the prince uses “extreme violence” and “manifestly tends to the ruin of the nation” in which
the prince himself can be targeted).
58. See Mónica García-Salmones Rovira, The Project of Positivism in International Law 25
(2013); David Kennedy, International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History of an Illusion,
17 Quinn. L. Rev. 99, 113 (1996); Hersch Lauterpacht, Westlake and Present Day International Law,
15 Economica 307, 309 (1925) (noting that “undisputed domination of the positivist method” in the
early twentieth century).
59. John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined 176–77 (Sarah Austin ed., 1861).
Much of the early twentieth century positivist writing responded to that challenge. See, e.g.,
Oppenheim, supra note 14, § 2; cf. Kennedy, supra note 58, at 117 (noting that international law
positivists were ultimately describing “a self-evident system of rules”).
60. As stated by Oppenheim, “[t]he so-called Law of Nations is nothing else than a body of
customary and conventional rules regulating the conduct of the individual States with each other.”
Oppenheim, supra note 14, § 7. These rules are only those established by “common consent.” Id. §§ 11–12.
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as the main political actor, which in turn strengthened the notion of
61
sovereignty.
Of course, this process affected the relations between law and just
62
war theory. As long as there was no “judge” among nations, wars could
63
not be discussed in terms of objective justice. As phrased by Henry
Wheaton, “A war in form, or duly commenced, is to be considered, as to
64
its effects, as just on both sides.” Many positivists thus accepted war as a
given, a factual “condition” that international law merely attempted to
65
regulate. Oppenheim, for instance, even rejected the obligation to
present any justification for war, as it was a complete sovereign
66
prerogative. The system of international law was thus organized on an
axis between “war” and “peace.” It was a system not of justice but of
consequence: states could virtually always choose to wage war, if they
67
were willing to pay the practical—rather than legal—price. External
resorts to force were thus excluded from the legal discourse.
In its essence, this approach was replicated in the internal realm,
although not strictly in such terms. As absolute state sovereignty and its
derivative of nonintervention became the chief organizing principles of
international law, it became impossible to discuss internal resort to force
68
in international legal terms. In fact, just as international wars were
61. See Anne Orford, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect 150 (2011).
62. See generally Kress, supra note 11 (reflecting on the development on the international law by
identifying post-Westphalian shifts and hesitations).
63. Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law § 290 (Richard Henry Dana ed., 1866).
Indeed, some maintained the view that there are applicable moral criteria of just war, but these could
only be assessed by the participants themselves in absence of an external judge. See Theodore D.
Woolsey, Introduction to the Study of International Law § 111 (1860). This approach can be
found in Grotius’ reasoning—following medieval thought—according to which natural law bound “in
conscience” and was enforced by God, while positive law was enforceable by humans. See Lesaffer,
supra note 27, at 11–12.
64. Wheaton, supra note 63, § 295. For similar reasons regarding internal wars, see id. § 296.
65. Oppenheim, supra note 14, § 53 (“[W]ar is not inconsistent with, but a condition regulated by,
International Law.”); see Woolsey, supra note 63, § 110 (“International law assumes that there must
be ‘wars and fightings’ among nations, and endeavors to lay down rules by which they shall be brought
within the limits of justice and humanity.”); see also William Edward Hall, A Treatise on
International Law §§ 15–17 (2d ed. 1884).
66. Oppenheim, supra note 14, §§ 54, 61 (“[A]ll such rules [of just war] laid down by writers . . .
are rules of writers, but not rules of International Law.”).
67. Eliav Lieblich, International Law and Civil Wars: Intervention and Consent 74 (2013);
see, e.g., Oppenheim, supra note 14, § 53 (discussing “war” and “peace” as choices that states make,
each condition regulated by a different set of rules). It should also be added that in general, war was
perceived not only as beyond legal regulation, but also positively a legitimate mean of redress and
punishment. See David Luban, War as Punishment, 39 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 299 (2012). On the internal
level, dueling was de facto perceived as a legitimate means to settle disputes even well into the
nineteenth century. See Martin J. Wiener, Men of Blood: Violence, Manliness and Criminal
Justice in Victorian England 42–45 (2004).
68. See Kennedy, supra note 58, at 123–28 (detailing the development of the absolute
understanding of sovereignty throughout the nineteenth century). Robert Lansing, later Secretary of
State, defined sovereignty in the early twentieth century as “the power . . . to do all things in a state
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understood as a given fact of external relations, civil strife was a given
fact of internal relations. Thus, Woolsey, for instance, stated bluntly
69
“[w]ith civil wars international jus has nothing to do.” Wheaton
contended that like its approach toward international wars, international
70
law made no distinction “between a just and unjust” civil war. At best,
international law sought to regulate the effects of civil wars on third
parties; it was not concerned by the rights of the internal parties
71
themselves. In this context, the American Civil War provides a striking
example: although slavery was perceived as a glaring immorality by
Britain, the latter—as well as other major European powers—
72
maintained strict neutrality toward both parties.
The triumph of this approach was born through the political struggle
between competing visions of sovereignty in nineteenth century
Europe—pitting “legitimist” perceptions of sovereignty, espoused by the
conservative powers of the Holy Alliance, against those based on factual
73
effective control, championed by Britain. Legitimism presumed the
existence of essential, inherent rights of legitimate sovereignty, and thus
rejected any revolution or forcible resistance, while justifying intervention to
maintain beleaguered monarchs. Unsurprisingly, the Holy Alliance was
viewed as a “union of despotic sovereigns” by the emerging liberal
74
order. Legitimism and its attendant doctrine of intervention eroded
with the growing predominance of Britain, which condemned it as
inconsistent with international law, and specifically with the principle of
75
nonintervention. A nineteenth century commentator noted that the
without accountability;” its exercise “is simply the application or the menace of brute force.” Robert
Lansing, Notes on Sovereignty in a State, 1 Am. J. Int’l L. 105, 110 (1907); see also Montague
Bernard, On the Principle of Non-Intervention (1860); Augustus Granville Stapleton,
Intervention and Non-intervention: The Foreign Policy of Great Britain from 1790 to 1865, at 3–
15 (1866). In the context of civil wars, see Samuels, supra note 11, at 319.
69. Woolsey, supra note 63, § 136.
70. Wheaton, supra note 63, § 23.
71. Lieblich, supra note 67, at 6 (arguing that in traditional international law the key question
asked by states was “how does the conflict affect us” rather than “how does the conflict affect the
political and humanitarian rights of internal parties”).
72. See id. at 99–106; Montague Bernard, A Historical Account of the Neutrality of Great
Britain During the American Civil War 122–50 (1870) (detailing the Europeans’ declarations of
neutrality, including original texts of declarations); see also John Stuart Mill, The Contest in
America 6 (1862).
73. Thomas D. Grant, The Recognition of States: Law and Practice in Debate an Evolution
8–9 (1999).
74. See, e.g., Stapleton, supra note 68, at 28 (“[T]here can be no doubt that in fact this [Holy]
Alliance was nothing else but a union of despotic sovereigns in order to aid each other in protecting
their absolute authority.”); see also Edward Payson Powell, Nullification and Secession in the
United States: A History of the Six Attempts During the First Century of the Republic 243
(1897); Wheaton, supra note 63, §§ 64–65.
75. Powell, supra note 74, at 243 (labeling Britain’s turn against legitimism as “the greatest event
of the nineteenth century”); Stapleton, supra note 68, at 27–37 (contrasting the view of continental
powers of the Holy Alliance and Britain regarding the question of legitimism and intervention);
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principle of nonintervention became so dominant that “British statesmen
had proclaimed it [as a principle of international law] not once, not twice,
76
but on every imaginable occasion.” Divine or historic right thus gave
way to effective control over territory as the key determinant of
sovereign power, and effectiveness—being a question of fact—could be
gained (or maintained) by brute power, whether exercised by
77
governments or rebels.
Despite this harsh outcome, effectiveness has some liberal appeal: it
is based on the premise that peoples should be left alone to establish (or
abolish) their own governments, without external interference, by the
78
means they choose. With the solidification of the principle of selfdetermination in the twentieth century, the principle of nonintervention
thus found support also among liberal internationalists. Oscar Schachter,
for instance, argued that the use of internal force was a corollary of
peoples’ right to “decide for themselves what kind of government they
want, and that this includes the right . . . to carry on armed conflict
79
between competing groups.”
A further legal corollary of the predominance of sovereignty and
nonintervention was the negation of individuals as subjects of
international law: if state sovereignty is paramount, individuals must be
subject only to the domestic system and thus remain beyond the reach of
80
international regulation. Now, if international law could not impose
duties, nor confer rights, upon individuals, it per se could not legalize nor
81
prohibit resistance. Precisely for this reason Oppenheim stated that
international law “is not competent to forbid private individuals to take
82
up arms.”

Wheaton, supra note 63, §§ 65–67 (detailing the British position regarding several internal conflicts in
the 1820s).
76. Stapleton, supra note 68, at 35.
77. Grant, supra note 73, at 9; Lieblich, supra note 67, at 22–23.
78. Bernard, supra note 68, at 9; Hall, supra note 65, § 94; Stapleton, supra note 68, at 3–15;
Wheaton, supra note 63, § 72.
79. Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1620, 1641 (1984);
see also Falk, supra note 12, at 1, 5–6.
80. See, e.g., Oppenheim, supra note 14, § 13 (“Subjects of the rights and duties arising from the
Law of Nations are States solely and exclusively.”); cf. Lauterpacht, supra note 58, at 309–10
(describing this doctrine critically).
81. In the context of civil wars, international law only “kicked in” upon recognition of
belligerency or insurgency, but this regulation, too, did not refer to the resort to force itself but only to
the conduct of hostilities and rights vis-à-vis third parties. Lieblich, supra note 67, at 76–80. The
earliest systematic exposition of the belligerency doctrine can be found in Richard Dana’s 1866 notes
to Wheaton’s Elements of International Law. See Wheaton, supra note 63, § 23 n.15.
82. Oppenheim, supra note 14, § 57, at 92. This remains true although in the in bello level,
individuals can be punished for fighting by the enemy. See id. It should be noted that Oppenheim
discusses here the participation of individuals in international wars, but the reasoning applies of course
also to internal wars.
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However, saying that international law does not regulate armed
83
resistance, or is “neutral” toward it, is not only doubtful in terms of legal
84
theory, but also for all practical purposes, amounts to a recognition of a
85
freedom to act. Thus, this “gap” in international law is in fact a legal
carte blanche for resort to force both by sovereigns and subjects. As
phrased by Hall:
International law professes to be concerned with the relations of states
to each other. Tyrannical conduct of a government towards its subjects,
massacres and brutality in a civil war . . . are acts which have nothing to
do directly or indirectly with such relations. . . . To some minds the
excess of a revolution would seem more scandalous than the tyranny of
a sovereign. In strictness they [tyranny and resistance] ought, degree for
86
degree, to be precisely equivalent in the eye of the law.

In sum, the positivist, pre-Charter approach could be described as
“negative unification” of jus ad bellum: international law assumed freedom
to act both externally or internally. It reflected a coherent—even if
objectionable—view about what international law can and cannot do.
The international system finally moved to curtail (but not abolish)
the war power of states after World War I, through the elaborate system
87
enshrined in the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Covenant,
however, remained silent on internal resort to force, by excluding
matters “solely within the domestic jurisdiction” of a state party from the
88
jurisdiction of the League. Later on, the Kellogg-Briand Pact manifestly
89
renounced war only in relations between states, and the U.N. Charter,
as discussed above, followed suit. Here, the foundations were made to a
curious inconsistency in the modern international legal order—the
divergence of external and internal jus ad bellum. While the former is
strictly regulated, complete freedom is implied regarding the latter.
C. A Critique of Doctrinal Divergence
That the divergence discussed above raises significant problems is
obvious. While earlier approaches—natural law and positivism—were
upfront in their (positive or negative) attitudes toward all forms of force,
it is increasingly difficult to defend a system that sets out to prohibit
83. See, e.g., Malcolm N. Shaw, Self-Determination and the Use of Force, in Minorities, Peoples
and Self-Determination 35, 44 (Nazila Ghanea & Alexandra Xanthaki eds., 2005) (“The UN Charter
neither confirms nor denies a right of rebellion. It is neutral.”).
84. See Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law 304–07 (1952) (discussing so-called
“gaps” in international law).
85. See id. at 305.
86. Hall, supra note 65, at 264–65 (emphasis added).
87. Covenant of the League of Nations, June 28, 1919, 4 U.K.T.S. 153 arts. 10–16.
88. Id. art. 15. The exclusion of internal conflicts from the League system was the main legal
excuse for the League’s inaction toward the Spanish Civil War. See Lieblich, supra note 67, at 115–16.
89. General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 27,
1928, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
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external resorts to force, yet turns a blind eye to internal ones. If a key
objective of the contemporary legal order is to prevent the “scourge” of
90
war, and it is a consensus that this scourge is no less grave in internal
wars, a gross incoherency is revealed, which in turn affects the legitimacy
91
of the legal order. In fact, this incoherency also undermines the
prohibition on external force itself, given the tendency of internal
92
conflicts to internationalize.
Moreover, the traditional jurisprudential explanations for the
nonregulation of internal resort to force have become blatantly
unconvincing. While in the past, sovereignty and nonintervention served
as bulwarks for any international legal regulation of internal relations,
contemporary international law reaches deep into spheres long considered
93
at the core of state authority. Indeed, the protection of human rights, the
94
regulation of national treatment of goods, and the protection of
95
investors are not only pragmatic results of increasing interdependence,
96
but also reflect the ever-changing understanding of sovereignty. In
practice, international law’s extension to such fields weakens any claim
that sovereignty in itself can serve as a shield against regulation of
internal resorts to force; this is especially true considering the effects of
civil wars on human life and well being. Conceptually, sovereignty itself
was rephrased as a “responsibility” in contemporary international
97
discourse, which further weakens the thrust of nonintervention as a
justification for nonregulation. Similarly, the liberal, self-determination
based justification for the freedom to resort to force internally is also
unappealing. At its core, it requires us to concede that self-determination
is a corollary of the ability to use effective violence—a view that depletes
98
the idea of any substantive content.

90. U.N. Charter pmbl.
91. On the importance of coherence to normative legitimacy see Thomas Franck, The Power of
Legitimacy Among Nations 150–82 (1990).
92. See generally Patrick M. Regan, Interventions into Civil Wars: Literature, Contemporary
Policy and Future Research, in Routledge Handbook of Civil Wars 313 (Edward Newman & Karl
DeRouen Jr., eds., 2014) (discussing both intervention by diplomatic and military or economic means
in civil wars).
93. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR].
94. See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 art. III.
95. See, e.g., Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals
of Other States, March 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
96. Cf. Eyal Benvenisti, Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of States to
Foreign Stakeholders, 107 Am. J. Int’l L. 295, 295–301 (2013) (noting that due to modern global
interconnectedness, sovereigns must take into account the external effects of their decisions).
97. G.A. Res. 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, (Sept. 16, 1948).
98. Lieblich, supra note 67, at 139; see also Dapo Akande & Zachary Vermeer, The Airstrikes
Against Islamic State in Iraq and the Alleged Prohibition on Military Assistance to Governments in Civil
Wars, EJIL: Talk! (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-airstrikes-against-islamic-state-in-iraqand-the-alleged-prohibition-on-military-assistance-to-governments-in-civil-wars/.
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Additionally, the orthodox claim that actions by individuals are per
se beyond the reach of international law—and thus it is conceptually
impossible, as a matter of legal theory, to restrict resorts to force by
opposition groups—has long been discredited not only in jurisprudential
99
terms, but also by modern practice. For instance, the growing body of
international criminal law imposes obligations on individuals and confers
100
rights on victims. Likewise, it is nowadays a consensus that during
hostilities, treaty and customary IHL binds not only states, but also
101
nonstate actors. Indeed, if international law presumes to regulate the
conduct of hostilities in noninternational armed conflicts, there is no
conceptual barrier to regulation of noninternational resort to hostilities.
Both levels require assessment of highly complex decisions undertaken
by states and nonstate actors alike. In this context, the reach of
international law into the substate levels is also evident in the practice of
the U.N. Security Council. The Security Council’s imposition of sanctions
on individuals and nonstate entities has become a regular feature of the
102
international system. Recently, however, the Council has gone further:
not only did it single out certain opposition groups as culprits, and call
103
upon governments to act against them, but it has also urged nonstate
104
actors to “commit to combating” other armed groups.
In sum, considering the detrimental effects of civil wars, the current
legal regime’s incoherence with regard to the use of force is glaring. As
demonstrated above, nowadays, there are no substantial theoretical
barriers to extend the law on the use of force to the internal sphere. This
is because the traditional challenges to the international regulation of
internal resort to force—sovereignty, self-determination, and the

99. See, e.g., Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law 97 (1952) (“Like all law,
international law, too, is a regulation of human conduct. It is to men that the norms of international
law apply; it is against men that they provide sanctions . . . [the traditional view that only states are
subjects of international law] is untenable.”); Hersch Lauterpacht, International Law and Human
Rights ch. 2 (1950) (discussing individuals as subjects of international law).
100. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 1, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90 (granting the Court jurisdiction over persons); id. art. 75 (concerning reparations to victims).
101. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 135; see also Dinstein, supra note 11, at 63–73 (explaining “why” IHL binds nonstate actors).
102. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1267, ¶ 4 (Oct. 15, 1999).
103. See S.C. Res. 1746, ¶ 25 (Mar. 23, 2007) (calling upon the Afghan government and the
international community to “address the threat” of the Taliban, Al-Qaida, and other groups); see also
Ezequiel Heffes et al., Addressing Armed Opposition Groups Through Security Council Resolutions: A
New Paradigm? 18 Max Planck Y.B. U.N. L. 32 (2014).
104. S.C. Res. 2139, ¶ 14 (Feb. 22, 2014) (“Strongly condemns the increased terrorist attacks . . .
carried out by organizations and individuals associated with Al-Qaeda, its affiliates and other terrorist
groups, urges the opposition groups to maintain their rejection of these organizations and individuals
which are responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law . . . calls upon the Syrian
authorities and opposition groups to commit to combating and defeating organizations and individuals
associated with Al-Qaeda, its affiliates and other terrorist groups.”).
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exclusion of individuals as international legal subjects—are no longer
convincing in themselves.
II. A Revisionist Approach Toward Internal JUS AD BELLUM
A. Revisionist Just War Theory and Internal Resort to Hostilities
The previous Part argued that an international legal regime which
presumes a freedom of internal resort to force is untenable. What, then,
are the proper theoretical and ethical grounds through which to assess
possible legal restrictions on such actions? In terms of just war theory,
the key question is how to define a just cause for internal hostilities,
whether by governments or opposition. Before formulating a response,
we first have to address a preliminary question: whether different basic
rules on resort to force should apply to governments, peoples, groups, or
individuals. This discussion invokes a major clash in the field of just war
theory in the past two decades, between traditionalists and revisionists.
Traditional just war thought assumes that the state possesses special
transcendental rights, perhaps best explained as a form of political
105
theology. These essential characteristics might allow the state to resort
to force where it would be morally dubious for any other actor to do so.
International legal orthodoxy, accordingly, holds that on the interstate
level, a state is entitled to (proportionately) repel any forcible
106
encroachment upon its sovereignty or territorial integrity —
presumably, even when the first aggression does not result in loss of
107
108
life. Possible examples could be “aerial incursions,” cross-border
109
minesweeping activities, or situations in which an empty territory is
occupied. How can such a right to kill, with no clear-cut threat to life, be
justified as necessary and proportional? While some philosophers offer
competing, ever complex justifications for countering such “lesser
110
111
aggressions” by force, others outright deny its moral plausibility.

105. See Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty 36
(George Schwab trans., 2005); Paul W. Kahn, Political Theology: Four New Chapters on the
Concept of Sovereignty 1–30 (2011).
106. See Tom Ruys, The Meaning of “Force” and the Boundaries of the Jus ad Bellum: Are
“Minimal” Uses of Force Excluded from the UN Charter Article 2(4)?, 108 Am. J. Int’l L. 159, 189 (2014).
107. For instance, when an “invasion” occurs. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX) art. 3(a) (Dec. 14, 1974).
108. See Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It 240
(1994).
109. The Corfu Channel Case (Merits), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 13 (Apr. 9).
110. The most convincing of which, in my eyes, being that in the usual course of events, when an
aggressor in fact invades a state’s territory by force, the chances are so high that it would use lethal
force to protect its gains, that force is justified in anticipation of the aggressor’s imminent forcible
reaction. See Jeff McMahan, War as Self-Defense, 18 Eth. & Int’l Aff. 75, 77–79 (2004) [hereinafter
McMahan, War as Self-Defense] (discussing self-defense in cases of “lesser aggression”). But see Jeff
McMahan, What Rights May Be Defended by Means of War, in The Morality of Defensive War,
supra note 13, at 115, 148 [hereinafter McMahan, What Rights May Be Defended] (modifying his
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Nonetheless, the legal orthodoxy resolves this question through a simple
analogy between the state and a physical person. Sovereignty and
territorial integrity are thus fictionalized as the personal autonomy and
physical body of the state, any violation of which justifies forcible
112
repelling. Now, since under most conventional thought, individuals are
not permitted to kill for every violation of autonomy or even of physical
integrity, the orthodox view assigns to states broader rights than those
enjoyed by the sum of the physical persons forming them. It thus
presumes that a state exists independently of the persons that comprise it
113
and thus enjoys additional rights they do not possess as individuals.
Granted, it is possible to argue that states bear different rights since they,
114
as opposed to individuals, are in an anarchic “state of nature.” But
even if that would be true, this can only explain why they are entitled to
resort to self-help to secure their rights (as a secondary norm), not why
they are entitled to resort to hostilities even when no life is immediately
115
threatened (as a primary norm).
That human beings, by operating collectively—and particularly in
the context of war—become subject to a different moral paradigm, is
116
indeed a common trait of traditional just war reasoning. Some of this
reasoning is rooted in duty-based doctrines that afforded special moral
117
status to rulers and holders of public office, perhaps as representatives
118
of God. Newer approaches tend to emphasize the political, arguing that
rules governing the resort to force by individuals, groups, peoples, or

argument); Helen Frowe, Defensive Killing ch. 5 (2014); see also Cécile Fabre, Cosmopolitanism
and Wars of Self-Defence, in The Morality of Defensive War, supra note 13, at 90; Seth Lazar,
National Defence, Self-Defence and the Problem of Political Aggression, in The Morality of
Defensive War, supra note 13, at 11. For a justification based on states as protectors of individual
rights, see Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars 54 (4th ed. 2006), which grounds national selfdefense on the claim that states protect the rights of their citizens and thus attack on the state is an
attack on individual rights, and see Yitzhak Benbaji, Distributive Justice, Human Rights, and
Territorial Integrity: A Contractarian Account of the Crime of Aggression, in The Morality of
Defensive War, supra note 13, at 159, which examines the rationale of the limited permissibility of
waging war only to defend legitimate state borders or on behalf of national defense.
111. David Luban, The Romance of the Nation-State, 9 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 392 (1980); David Rodin,
The Myth of National Self-Defense, in The Morality of Defensive War, supra note 13, at 81.
112. See Walzer, supra note 110, at 58 (discussing “the legalist paradigm”). For a critical overview
of this approach in international law, see David Rodin, War and Self-Defense 103–10 (2002).
113. See Kelsen, supra note 113, at 100–14 (vigorously deconstructing this perception).
114. For a classic view on interstate relations as anarchic, see Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of
International Politics ch. 6 (1979).
115. That is, unless we adopt the Hobbesian position of the state of nature as a per se state of war.
See Hobbes, supra note 52, ch. 13. But if this is our view of the international system, we must reject the
plausibility of international law to begin with.
116. Jeff McMahan, Killing in War 15, 35–37, 79–84 (2009).
117. See, e.g., Pufendorf, supra note 52, at 718 (justifying a duty of nonresistance based on the
Prince’s “high and noble office”). For a critique, see Cécile Fabre, Cosmopolitanism, Just War Theory
and Legitimate Authority, 84 Int’l Aff. 963 (2008).
118. See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text.
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states are intrinsically different, since collective action implies political
motivation. As put by Christopher Kutz, “[w]hen individuals’ wills are
linked together in politics . . . this affects the normative valence of what
119
they do individually as part of that politics.” Such collectivist views
would find no special problem in formulating different rules on resort to
lethal force based on political standing. For instance, while individuals
would only be permitted to kill in defense of life against imminent
unlawful threats, armed groups can fight for democracy, peoples can kill
to achieve self-determination, and states can resort to internal hostilities
in order to safeguard their sovereignty as such.
However, the collectivist underpinnings of traditional just war
theory have been increasingly challenged by a revisionist approach,
spearheaded by Jeff McMahan. The revisionists’ basic claim is that war,
simply by virtue of being an act of mass violence, is not governed by a
morality different from any other human action, and thus, when it comes
120
to killing, the same ethics apply to individuals and collectives. This view
has dramatic consequences in many aspects of just war theory. Most
importantly, it affects the traditional assumption of a moral equality—
121
and thus the equal liability to attack—of “just” and “unjust” combatants.
For us, however, the relevant point is that revisionists convincingly reject
collectivist approaches to the morality of war. As McMahan points out,
that people merely by acting “politically” through groups, are morally
entitled to do what they are prohibited from as individuals is an
122
unacceptable form of “moral alchemy.” Now, if collectives and individuals
are subject to the same “morality of killing,” this must mean that the same
moral standards concerning resort to hostilities should apply to governments
123
and rebel groups.

119. Christopher Kutz, The Difference Uniforms Make: Collective Violence in Criminal Law and
War, 33 Phil. & Pub. Affairs 148, 156 (2005), cited in McMahan, supra note 116, at 81.
120. See Frowe, supra note 110, at 2; McMahan, supra note 116, ch. 2.
121. McMahan, supra note 116, at 1–15, 35. McMahan suggests that liability to attack must follow
moral responsibility, and thus challenges the traditional approach, mainly represented by Michael
Walzer. See Walzer, supra note 110. Walzer assumes that “just” combatants can be killed by “unjust”
combatants merely because they represent a threat, without reference to the justness of their cause. Id.
122. McMahan, supra note 116, at 82. Of course, there are those who disagree. See, e.g., Rodin,
supra note 112, at 6 (challenging the reductive approach to self-defense). But see McMahan, supra
note 110 (rebutting these challenges).
123. Interestingly, traces of the equality of rulers and rebels, for this purpose, is found already in
John Locke, to whom once force is used, “war levels the parties” and cancels our any relations of
“reverence, respect, and superiority.” John Locke, Second Treatise of Government § 235 (Richard
H. Cox ed., Harlan Davidson, Inc. 1982) (1689) (“But to resist force with force, being the state of war
that levels the parties, cancels all former relation of reverence, respect, and superiority: and then the
odds that remains, is, that he, who opposes the unjust aggressor, has this superiority over him, that he
has a right, when he prevails, to punish the offender, both for the breach of the peace, and all the evils
that followed upon it.”). Nonetheless, I set aside, for now, second-order epistemological
considerations that might advantage governments in such situations. Indeed, epistemological
considerations have significant pedigree in writings that embrace the preference of rulers in the
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B. Reductive Individualism and the Self-Defense Standard
Having established the view that internal jus ad bellum should be
discussed under the assumption of equal moral rules, we still need to
address the question of just cause: when are individuals, groups, peoples,
or states justified in resorting to hostilities? Most revisionist theorists
approach this issue through the technique of “reductive individualism.”
First, they inquire when individuals are permitted to resort to lethal
force. Unsurprisingly, the most widely accepted answer, in ethics and
law, is that individuals are only allowed to kill in self-or other-defense
against an unjustified grave harm, subject to necessity and proportionality
124
limitations. Once establishing this baseline, revisionists proceed to apply
this standard to collectives. Using increasingly complex factual scenarios,
they describe war as nothing more than a web of forcible actions in self125
or-other-defense. Importantly, revisionists do not deny that war carries
with it especially difficult conditions. They concede that during war, the
right to self-defense might materialize in wider circumstances than in
“regular” scenarios, namely because the nature of the threat emanating
126
from the enemy’s combatants is continuous, and the fog of war results
127
in significant epistemological challenges. But these are factual, not
ethical distinctions.

context of resort to internal armed force. See, e.g., Pufendorf, supra note 52, at 718, 720–21 (“[T]he
acts of civil government are for the most part so obscure, that the multitude cannot apprehend the
equity or the necessity of them.”). This argument is also made by Hobbes, who claimed that subjects
are incapable of understanding complex and long-term policy. See Hobbes, supra note 52, ch. XVIII
(“[A]ll men are by nature provided of notable multiplying glasses (that is their passions and self-love)
through which every little payment appeareth a great grievance, but are destitute of those prospective
glasses (namely moral and civil science) to see afar off the miseries that hang over them and cannot
without such payments be avoided.”). But see McMahan, supra note 116, at 66–70 (questioning the
epistemological advantages of governments). Yet, even if epistemological considerations should be
taken into account, it would at most result in a factual presumption in favor of governments, but would
not challenge the primary rule itself. See infra Part V.
124. See Frowe, supra note 110, at 1–3. It is beyond the scope of this Article to offer a lengthy
defense of the self-defense standard itself, both as an enabling and constraining one. As an enabling
standard, it is recognized as a basic law of nature even in the dark state of nature of Hobbes. See
Hobbes, supra note 52, ch. 14. In its constraining role, it can be justified both through deontological
reasoning and consequentialist analysis, which would emphasize the negative results of a more
permissive rule. For a discussion in light of Kantian ethics, see Whitley R.P. Kaufman, Justified
Killing: The Paradox of Self-Defense 2, 50–52 (2009).
125. See Fabre, supra note 6, at 65–71; Frowe, supra note 110, at 1–3, 123–24; McMahan, supra
note 110, at 75–76. For a critique, see David Luban, Human Rights Thinking and the Laws of War, in
Theoretical Boundaries of Armed Conflict and Human Rights 32–33 (Jens David Ohlin ed.,
forthcoming).
126. McMahan, War as Self-Defense, supra note 110, at 76 (arguing that it is permissible, for
instance, to kill sleeping soldiers since “[w]ar involves threats that consist of activities organized in
phases over extended periods of time”).
127. McMahan, supra note 116, at 157. Janina Dill thus refers to war as an “epistemically cloaked
forced choice” regarding the protection of individual rights. Janina Dill, Should International Law
Ensure the Moral Acceptability of War?, 26 Leiden J. Int’l L. 253, 254 (2013).
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This standard can be adapted to the internal realm as well and
accordingly shape international legal doctrine. As convincingly argued by
Cécile Fabre, when it comes to killing, “the geographical location of a
conflict (as within or across borders) and the political status of its actors
are irrelevant to the determination of the latter’s rights, duties and
128
liabilities.” Granted, conflicts within a single political community—in
particular considering the asymmetry between governments and other
actors—might raise some complex and salient issues that might not be
129
relevant to interstate contexts. Arguably, these can require some
modifications in our reasoning, when moving from the individual to the
collective, and from the external to the internal. However, in legal terms,
these modifications would be in the form of presumptions in favor of this
or that factual or legal conclusion: it would not modify the basic rule that
internal resort to hostilities is prohibited, unless undertaken for self-orother-defense.
Additionally, when constructing the scope of the right to selfdefense, further adaptations must be made when moving from the realm
of ethics to that of law. In ethics, some claim that killing in self-or-otherdefense could be permitted even against several grave nonlethal threats,
including perhaps, “theft of property if the effect on the owner’s well130
131
being would be profound,” forms of “political” aggression, and threats
emanating not from direct lethal force but from severe deprivation of
132
material resources. When applying utilitarian ethics, some might even
justify the resort to force in other circumstances, provided it would
133
constitute a “lesser evil.” However, in law, considerations of legal policy
such as the need for clarity, the problem of slippery slope, potential of
abuse and manipulation, and the danger of false subjective judgment
134
play a constraining role in the normative design. In other words, when

128. Fabre, supra note 6, at 131. At this point an objection can be made that this reasoning
invalidates the basic idea that a state must enjoy a monopoly over the use of violence, thereby leading
to anarchy. See Weber, supra note 14. However, if we recognize any form of a legitimate right to selfdefense by individuals—as all legal systems do—then we actually admit that this monopoly is not
really absolute to begin with. That is to say, my suggestion does not really challenge the prevailing
Weberian idea of state monopoly on violence since that monopoly never precluded self-defense.
Indeed, even under Hobbes’ unlimited Leviathan individuals retained the right to self-defense. See
Glenn Burgess, On Hobbesian Resistance Theory, in XLII Political Studies 62, 63–65 (1994); Peter J.
Steinberger, Hobbesian Resistance, 46 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 856, 856–57 (2002).
129. Fabre, supra note 6, at 135–48 (discussing and rejecting the claims that a “special
relationship” between the state and individuals, or the fact that insurgents have no formal political
status, substantially affects the question of resort to force).
130. McMahan, War as Self-Defense, supra note 110, at 79.
131. See, e.g., Frowe, supra note 110, at 139–45.
132. Fabre, supra note 6, ch. 3 (discussing “severe deprivation” as a just cause for war).
133. Cf. Dill, supra note 127, at 259–60.
134. For these reasons, the U.N. Charter’s Article 51 restricts interstate self-defense to situations
of an “armed attack” and not to other types of nonphysical threats. See, e.g., Tom Ruys, “Armed
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resort to force is involved, law should be more wary of a system that
opens the door for false positives. Perhaps, this is even more so in the
complex, asymmetric environment of intrastate relations. This is not to
say that the full spectrum of morality has no place in the legal discourse:
in law, the distinction between what is permissible legally and what could
be permissible morally is and ought to be reflected in the distinction
135
between ex ante permission versus ex post defenses. This Article,
however, focuses on the general rule, not on possible ex post excuses.
III. Collectivist Visions of Internal JUS AD BELLUM
We are now in the position to explore international legal doctrine in
light of the general ethical standard suggested above, as well as other
relevant considerations. This Part discusses doctrines that might reflect
collectivist visions of internal jus ad bellum and reveals why these are
unsatisfactory as legal standards.
A. Self-Determination
In the post-Charter years, the international system was plagued by
Cold War struggles and heightened tensions between crumbling empires
136
and anticolonialist movements. In this environment, the prohibition on
the use of force, as enshrined in the Charter’s Article 2(4), clearly failed
to provide answers to one of the most pressing question of the times—
chiefly, the role of force in the relations between stability and revolution,
and between the principles of territorial integrity of states versus self137
determination of peoples. Simply reiterating that the Charter reaffirmed
the preexisting silence toward noninternational resorts to force could not
satisfy the complex interests concerning these questions, neither those of
anticolonial movements nor of states. Complete silence could not serve
anticolonial movements, since it meant that states were free to forcibly
suppress any struggle for self-determination, without international legal
consequence. Accordingly, they pressed for rules to prohibit such
forcible actions; rules that can be understood as correlating with aspects
138
of jus ad bellum. But silence was also problematic for major Cold War
Attack” and Article 51 of the UN Charter 55–56, 183, 324 (2010). One would be hard-pressed to
argue for a wider standard when discussing internal self-defense.
135. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 949, 958 (1985)
(discussing excuse and justification defenses in criminal law). In the international context, see
Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report 164 (2000) (differentiating
between ex ante unlawfulness and possible ex post legitimacy in the discussion of unilateral
humanitarian intervention).
136. See Moyn, supra note 8, at 94.
137. See Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal 197 (1995).
138. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations (Oct. 24, 1970) (“Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives
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powers, since it assumed the freedom to forcibly repress democratic
139
change on the one hand, and socialist revolution on the other. To
further complicate the map of interests, both bloc powers and
anticolonial movements—which envisioned themselves as future
sovereigns—were well aware that limiting resort to force by rulers, for
whatever reason, is a double-edged sword: indeed, armed rebellion could
140
also be directed against themselves or their allies.
These mutually offsetting interests prompted international lawyers
to construct ways to control noninternational resorts to force without
explicitly regulating intrastate armed violence. The chief method to do so
was to dodge the question by excluding certain conflicts from the internal
realm to begin with. Repeatedly, therefore, rival blocs condemned
internal conflicts as inauthentic proxy wars. If a certain conflict was not
truly internal, preferring one side over the other—governments or
rebels—could be justified without making a clear determination on the
141
limits of internal jus ad bellum. The Reagan Doctrine, for instance, was
142
constructed as a response against “Soviet supported aggression,” and
was phrased by one of its key theorists, Jeane Kirkpatrick, as a
counterintervention in a case where a totalitarian government was
143
maintained by “foreign forces.” Similarly, the Soviet Brezhnev Doctrine,
which was used to bolster or contain internal revolutions or resorts to
force, frequently relied on previous Western intervention in order to
144
discredit the “authenticity” of the conflict.
Like proxy wars, anticolonial struggles for self-determination were
also excluded from the internal sphere. This granted them some measure
of legitimacy, without jeopardizing sovereignty or territorial integrity and
without saying anything about internal resort to force. Thus, for instance,
the U.N. General Assembly, in its 1970 Declaration on Friendly
Relations, stated that “[t]he territory of a colony or other Non-SelfGoverning Territory has . . . a status separate and distinct from the

peoples referred to in the elaboration of the principle of equal rights and self-determination.”); G.A.
Res. 1514 (XV), Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, ¶ 4,
(Dec. 16, 1960) (“All armed action . . . directed against dependent peoples shall cease . . .”); see also
Cassese, supra note 137, at 194–97; Shaw, supra note 83, at 44.
139. See Falk, supra note 79, at 6–7 (exemplifying during the Cold War that “[i]n a period of
revolutionary ferment any given government . . . will sometimes favor the incumbent and sometimes
the insurgent, depending on the setting”).
140. See Moyn, supra note 8, at 84–119 (discussing the preoccupation of anticolonialist movements
with sovereignty).
141. Lieblich, supra note 67, at 169–72; Falk, supra note 79, at 3.
142. Ronald Reagan, President of the U.S., Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the
State of the Union (Feb. 6, 1985).
143. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick & Allan Gerson, The Reagan Doctrine, Human Rights, and International
Law, in Right v. Might: International Law and the Use of Force 19, 20 (Louis Henkin et al. eds., 1991).
144. This was the case, for instance, in the 1956 Soviet intervention in Hungary. See 1956 U.N.Y.B.
67–69, U.N. Sales No. 1957.I.1.
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145

territory of the State administering it.” Similarly, in a 1975 resolution,
the Institut de Droit International, excluded from the term “civil war”
146
“conflicts arising from decolonization.” This tendency was reflected
also in Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I, which classified
international armed conflicts for the purpose of IHL as “armed conflicts
in which peoples are fighting . . . in the exercise of their right of self147
determination.” To further shield the internal realm against selfdetermination struggles, international discourse made clear that generally, in
situations beyond anticolonial struggles, the conservative principles of
national unity, territorial integrity, nonintervention, and sovereignty still
148
held sway.
However, the exclusion of anticolonial struggles from the internal
realm cannot end the debate on self-determination and internal force.
This is because the right to self-determination applies to all peoples, even
149
beyond the colonial context. Can peoples thus resort to internal force
when the right to self-determination is deprived of them? It is helpful to
note that even concerning anticolonial self-determination struggles, this
point proved controversial. The Declaration on Friendly Relations, as
well as other relevant documents, recognized that peoples have a right to
resist forcible action depriving them of self-determination, and that they
are entitled to receive support in such resistance, but only in accordance
150
with the principles of the U.N. Charter. While most “Third World”
states understood this formulation as recognizing the right to use force
against the mere existence of colonial regimes, many Western states
maintained that it only goes as far as to acknowledge that such a right
151
exists in response to forcible suppression actions by the colonial power.
Although it is tempting to deride the Western approach as the dying
breath of empire—and this would be at least partially true—it has its
ethical merits. As discussed earlier on, assuming that equal morality
applies to individuals and collectives, merely having a primary “right” to

145. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 138. Until the mid-twentieth century, anticolonial struggles were
considered, for the purpose of international law, as internal conflicts. See Lieblich, supra note 67, at
220–21; Shaw, supra note 83, at 43–44.
146. Institut de Droit International, The Principle of Non-Intervention in Civil Wars art. 1(2)(c)
(Aug. 14, 1975).
147. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 1(4), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (June 8 1977).
148. G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 138, arts. 6–7; see also Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to
Democratic Governance, 86 Am. J. Int’l L. 46, 54 (1992) (noting the self-determination “evolved in a
way that did not legitimate self-determination of minorities within a colony”).
149. All peoples enjoy the right to self-determination. See ICCPR, supra note 93, art. 1(1).
150. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 138; G.A. Res 3314, supra note 107, art. 7 (referring to the right to
“struggle” for self-determination); see also Shaw, supra note 83, at 44.
151. See Shaw, supra note 83, at 44–45; see also Cassese, supra note 137, at 197–98; Corten, supra
note 10, at 22. For a comprehensive discussion, see Heather A. Wilson, International Law and the
Use of Force by National Liberation Movements (1988).
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something—self-determination or otherwise—does not necessarily entail
also a secondary right to kill to acquire it. For instance, we might agree
that if country A deprives people B of education in their native language,
A violates B’s right to self-determination. But we would most certainly
object that B is thereby justified to spark a civil war due to this
deprivation. This hypothetical reveals a key limitation of selfdetermination as an independent baseline for internal jus ad bellum: the
fact that in actuality, it encompasses a spectrum of rights, the violation of
which is of varying degrees of severity. Indeed, in the post-colonial era,
this feature of self-determination was made abundantly clear, as the
principle was constructed as a bundle of liberal democratic human
152
rights. Assigning a right to resort to force, thus, for any violation of
153
self-determination, seems too permissive.
What violation of the rights comprising self-determination would, if
at all, justify internal resort to force? Clearly, it would be needed to
demonstrate that a threat emanating from a particular deprivation of
self-determination would be so grave as to justify the right to kill.
Granted, even some revisionist philosophers concede that sometimes it is
morally justified to use force against deprivation of political self154
determination. However, I have already noted that due to considerations
of abuse and the danger of false positives, when constructing ex ante
permissions to use force, a legal regime should be more restrictive. Phrased
in this manner, it becomes clear that a deprivation of internal selfdetermination must be so severe as to constitute an imminent grave threat,
which actually merges with the self-defense standards suggested above.
In sum, while it is rather obvious to conclude that states are prohibited
from resorting to force in violation of the right to self-determination—both
in positive international law and a fortiori according to the restrictive,
self-defense standards suggested here—it is equally problematic to
invoke self-determination, in itself, as an enabling norm for armed rebellion
in the absence of a threat giving rise to the right to self-or-other-defense.
B. Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity Versus Secession
What about situations outside the context of colonial struggles—
which are generally understood as international—or in which a party
attempts unilateral secession? Does the international law concerning

152. Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.); Franck, supra note 148, at 52–
56, 58–59; see also Moyn, supra note 8, at 208 (situating the shift from anticolonial perceptions of selfdetermination to individual rights-based perceptions).
153. Cf. McMahan, What Rights May Be Defended, supra note 110, at 134–35.
154. See Fabre, supra note 110, at 99–114 (justifying war against deprivation of self-determination
where it is clear that severe human rights violations are imminent, or when the deprivation amounts to
a “conditional threat”). Note, however, that this approach essentially deconstructs deprivation of selfdetermination into self-defense. See also Fabre, supra note 6, at 138–39.
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secession tell us something also about the right to resort to force? Today,
it is fairly settled that international law does not recognize a right to
unilateral secession, and that the principle of territorial integrity trumps
155
This is clearly reflected in the
most countervailing interests.
international outrage concerning Crimea’s recent attempt to secede from
Ukraine, even if we assume that it was the genuine will of Crimea’s
156
Russian majority. Likewise, although the International Court of Justice
(“ICJ”), in a 2010 Advisory Opinion, opined that Kosovo’s 2008
unilateral declaration of independence was not contrary to international
law, the grounds for the opinion were very narrow: it focused on the act
of declaring independence itself, not on the broader issue of Kosovo’s
157
right to secede from Serbia.
But what if, in a certain instance, there is a collective right to secede
under international law? Does this also entail a right to use force to fulfill
it? Assume that province B within State A seeks to secede. Assume
further that the U.N. Security Council adopted a binding Chapter VII
Resolution recognizing, in principle, B’s right to secede, and that the
158
Security Council was acting within its powers to do so. State A does not
comply with the Resolution; however, being an otherwise reasonable
state, it does not resort to hostilities to prevent it, but rather uses its
justice system to prosecute separatists. Does this grant B a right to resort
to hostilities to give effect to the Resolution? The answer must be no,
since a positive reply again conflates a right to something with a right to
159
kill in order to secure it. Just as individual residents of province B
would not have a right to kill upon every violation of international norms
by A, they cannot do so collectively through their political representation
as a province. Of course, our analysis might change completely if we
accept the (controversial) doctrine of “remedial secession,” which
recognizes a right of unilateral secession in cases of grave human rights
160
violations by the rump state. In facts giving rise to such a right, we
might accept that B resort to force to effect secession; but this resort
would not be permissible because of the right to secede itself, but rather

155. Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra note 152; G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 138; see also
Christian Walter, Postscript: Self-Determination, Secession and the Crimean Crisis 2014, in SelfDetermination and Secession in International Law 293, 306 (Christian Walter et al. eds., 2014).
156. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 68/263, Territorial Integrity of Ukraine (Apr. 1, 2014). But see Vladimir
Putin, President of Russia, Address by President of the Russ. Federation (Mar. 18, 2014).
157. Kosovo Advisory Opinion, supra note 11, ¶¶ 78–121.
158. The closest “real life” situation can be found in Resolution 1244, in which the U.N. Security
Council effectively transferred the administration of Kosovo to the international community. Whether
this amounted to recognition of a right to secede is of course debatable. See S.C. Res. 1244 (June 10, 1999).
159. Indeed, this conclusion seems to conform to state practice in recent decades, condemning
forcible attempts at secession. For a brief analysis, see for example Antonello Tancredi, Secession and
Use of Force, in Self-Determination and Secession in International Law, supra note 155, at 68, 72–75.
160. See Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra note 152, ¶ 134; Walter, supra note 155, at 306–07.
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due to the nature of the threat caused by A, which also gives rise to a
right to self-defense.
Now let us assume that B fails to receive a Security Council
authorization, but unilaterally declares independence, and even moves to
organize its governmental agencies, including by establishing
rudimentary security forces. Can State A attack B to stop such actions?
Even if we assume that B has no right to secede under international law,
there is no reason to assume a priori that its actions militate a forcible
161
Indeed, some international jurisprudence implies that
response.
governments, in certain circumstances, are under a duty to regain control
162
over their territories in order to fulfill their human rights obligations.
But this cannot be construed as a duty or an unqualified authorization to
resort to hostilities to do so—as the proper choice of means must be
163
heavily dependent on the circumstances. For instance, the proper
choice of means can hinge on the question of whether loss of control is a
factual, passive product of state failure, or conversely, of active forcible
164
Returning to our
action by rebels against government forces.
hypothetical, perhaps State A can use its police or judiciary to restore
law and order, and thus refrain from killing; that is, unless B resorts to
hostilities first, and therefore A’s hostilities can be justified in self-orother-defense. This seems entirely commonsensical. Recall, that even in
the American Civil War, the Union formally resorted to hostilities
against the seceding Confederacy not in response to the secession itself,
but only when the Confederacy resisted Union presence by force,
165
famously by attacking Fort Sumter in April 12, 1861.
In sum, assuming a collective right to secession exists, a right to
resort to force does not necessarily follow—unless the right to secede is a
result of grave human rights violations. But in such case we are really
talking about force in self-defense, not force for the purpose of secession
per se. In the same vein, the legitimacy of a resort to force to prevent
secession would hinge on a first resort to hostilities by the seceding
party—meaning, on the existence of a just case of self-defense—not on

161. In a sense, such a situation mirrors the theoretical problem of “bloodless aggression” on the
international level. See Fabre, supra note 110, at 103–09.
162. See Ilaşcu v. Moldova, 2004-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 1134, ¶¶ 331-33, 340 cited in Tancredi, supra
note 159, at 69–70.
163. Cf. Ilaşcu, 2004-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 340–52. In general, the Court referred to the duty to
“act by taking all the political, judicial, and other measures at its disposal to reestablish its control.” Id.
¶ 340.
164. See Lieblich, supra note 15, at 138.
165. See Gary Gallagher et al., Civil War: Fort Sumter to Appomattox 31–33 (2014); see also
Stephen C. Neff, Justice in Blue and Gray: A Legal History of the Civil War 16–17 (2010);
Quincy Wright, The American Civil War, in The International Law of Civil War, supra note 12, at
30, 42; see also The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 669 (1863) (stressing the hostile nature of
Confederate action as a trigger to the Civil War).
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the right to safeguard territorial integrity as such. Any other result
assumes a discontinuity of morality when moving from the individual to
the collective.
C. Democratic Legitimacy
Does the character of a regime affect the question of internal jus ad
bellum? Indeed, governmental legitimacy is a tempting prism through
which to analyze internal resorts to force. In liberal discourse, legitimacy
interacts closely with the idea of rule by consent. Applied to the issue at
hand, such an approach would equalize a totalitarian regime with an
aggressor. Accordingly, a democratic government would be entitled to
resort to various measures—including, perhaps, to force—to protect
itself against antidemocratic elements, while nondemocratic regimes
would be prohibited from taking such measures against democratic
166
opposition. Taken seriously, such an approach would also justify armed
rebellion against nondemocratic regimes and prohibit such force against
democratic governments. In short, the principled question under democratic
theory is whether the existence of democracy or authoritarianism alone can
affect the law on internal resort to force, or whether something additional
is needed.
Of course, to argue for such a legal rule requires saying something
about the status of democratic governance as a right under international
law, and also about the consequences of its breach. Indeed, in the 1990s,
just after the collapse of the iron curtain, the triumph of the liberal
democratic order seemed absolute, as the nations of the former Warsaw
167
Pact emerged as reborn democracies. These (and other) developments
have famously led Thomas Franck to proclaim that a “right to
democratic governance”—a “democratic entitlement”—was emerging
168
under customary international law. In essence, Franck celebrated a
new Pax Americana built around the “almost-complete triumph of the
169
democratic notions of Hume, Locke, Jefferson and Madison.”
Although, in hindsight, the celebratory tone was a tad immature,
Franck was careful enough to remain vague about the legal implications
of his claim. Although some suggested that the democratic entitlement
spawned a right of unilateral armed intervention by third parties when a
166. For a general discussion, see Gregory H. Fox & Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, in
Democratic Governance and International Law 389 (Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000)
(discussing the powers under international law of democracies to protect themselves through political
exclusion, but not focusing on the issue of hostilities).
167. For a general account, see Central and East European Politics: From Communism to
Democracy (Sharon L. Wolchik & Jane L. Curry eds., 2011); see also Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth,
Introduction: The Spread of Liberal Democracy and its Implications for International Law, in
Democratic Governance and International Law, supra note 166, at 1.
168. Franck, supra note 148.
169. Id. at 49.
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170

democratic government was deposed, Franck mainly argued that the
democratic entitlement meant that “only democracy and rule of law will
171
be capable of validating governance” and that citizens would look to
172
Namely, this
international law to guarantee that entitlement.
understanding implied a substantive theory of governmental recognition
173
based on democratic credentials; yet, like the mainstream writing on the
issue, Franck refrained from addressing the relations between democratic
174
governance and internal resorts to force.
Indeed, if a democratic entitlement exists, it could be deduced that
such an entitlement must prohibit antidemocratic coup d’états, as well as
175
the repression of democratic opposition. If this is true, it must follow
that armed activities undertaken for the purpose of achieving antidemocratic
objectives would also be prohibited. In this sense, the democratic
entitlement would entrench a general prohibition on the first resort to
force, at least within the democratic order. This of course fits nicely with
the general approach suggested here, that in any case force can be used
only in self-or-other-defense. The democratic entitlement does not,
however, say much about positive rights to use force, either by
democratic governments for the purpose of protecting democracy, or by
pro-democratic opposition in order to achieve it.
Now, that democracies are entitled to defend their political
176
systems—if needed by employing coercive measures—is beyond doubt.
However, this does not imply the right to resort to hostilities. Indeed, the
situations in which democracies could be allowed to resort to internal
hostilities—to killing—must be very narrowly defined, if they are not to
lose their democratic character to begin with. It thus becomes clear that
any rule regulating the resort to force would be less concerned with the
existence of a threat to democracy, but rather with its gravity, or the
means through which it is carried out. And the answer to the question

170. See W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law,
in Democratic Governance and International Law, supra note 166, at 239.
171. Franck, supra note 148, at 49.
172. Id. at 50.
173. Fox & Roth, supra note 167, at 9–12 (discussing the democratic entitlement and the international
law on recognition of governments).
174. See, e.g., id. at 11–13.
175. This notion is reflected in pro-democratic sanctions clauses entrenched in regional
arrangements. See, e.g., Constitutive Act of the African Union arts. 4(m), 4(p), July 11, 2000, 2158
U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security of the African Union
art. 4(j) (2002); Economic Community of West African States, Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for
Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security art. 25 (Dec. 10, 1999).
For an analysis of these instruments and others, see Lieblich, supra note 67, at 198–99, 210–11.
176. For instance, in the European Convention on Human Rights, coercive restrictions on rights
are usually limited to what is necessary in a democratic society. See Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms arts. 6(1), 8(2), 10(2), 11(2), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221
[hereinafter ECHR].

Lieblich-67.3.docx (Do Not Delete)

720

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

3/21/2016 10:20 PM

[Vol. 67:687

when such means could merit a forcible response cannot be phrased by
reference to democracy itself, but to other first principles.
Similarly, that oppressed people bear the right to overthrow
177
authoritarian government is long entrenched in liberal political theory.
This is also undisputed under international law, even under traditional
doctrine, not least because the latter presupposes an unlimited right of
178
revolution. Nonetheless, even if a democratic entitlement exists, this in
itself does not necessarily entail a right to resort to hostilities in order to
achieve democracy. This is because even if the democratic entitlement
implies a positive right to act, personally or collectively, and perhaps
engage in civil disobedience in order to bring about democratic
transition, it is debatable at best whether the permission to resort first to
armed hostilities is inherent in such right. The contrary position would be
to conflate the primary norm and the secondary norm meant to enforce
it: the right to something with the right to kill to acquire it. If justified
only on account of the political or collective nature of pro-democratic
rebellion, it assumes that separate morality governs “political” actions—
a notion already rejected. Again, we need other, first principles, to
explain when violations of democratic principles spawn a right to use armed
force.
The separation between ends and means, in this context, seems to
conform to our intuitions. For instance, while the Egyptian pro-democratic
179
revolution of 2011 was (almost) universally lauded, it is doubtful whether
similar reactions would follow if instead of peacefully occupying Tahrir
Square, the revolutionaries would have initiated a campaign of hostilities
against the Egyptian military. This intuition is rooted precisely in the
notion that the absence of democracy is not sufficient in itself to justify
resort to massive killing. This intuition also correlates with the practice of
democratic opposition movements as rational actors. Unsurprisingly, in
the first (democratic) stages of the Arab Spring, neither in Egypt and
Tunisia on the one hand, nor in Syria and Libya on the other, were
organized hostilities initiated by the opposition. Rather, the organized
armed opposition in Syria and Libya commenced only after the regimes
180
themselves attacked the protesters with significant force. Perhaps these

177. See, e.g., Fox & Nolte, supra note 166, at 432. For a theoretical survey, see Ginsburg et al.,
supra note 22, at 1191–1207; see also G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
pmbl. (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last
resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule
of law.”).
178. Lauterpacht, supra note 10, at 106–07.
179. See Hosni Mubarak Resigns: World Reaction, BBC News (Feb. 12, 2011), http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-middle-east-12435738.
180. For a timeline of the events in Syria, see Syria Profile—Timeline, BBC News (Dec. 9, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14703995; see also David Poort & Ismaeel Naar, Timeline:
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dynamics are unavoidable in practice: it is likely that authoritarian
regimes will always resort to escalating levels of force when confronting
even nonviolent challenges, since non-toleration of dissent is part and
181
parcel of what makes them authoritarian to begin with.
Intuition, however, is not enough, as the idea of a right of armed
rebellion against authoritarian regimes enjoys considerable pedigree in
social-contractarian liberal thought. John Locke, for instance, did not
constrain the right of forcible resistance only to cases of imminent and
tangible threat to life, but also to situations of tyranny. To Locke, the
state was a product of a social contract that aimed, by transferring
executive power to the public, to lift individuals from the state of
182
nature. The state rescues human society from the state of nature by
183
functioning as a “judge on earth” between individuals. An absolute
sovereign, conversely, cannot provide such redress and thus remains in
184
the state of nature with his subjects. By appropriating absolute power,
185
the ruler furthermore enters a state of war with the subjects. Thus,
Locke does not substantively differentiate between cases of extreme
186
danger caused by the ruler, usurpation or tyranny : subjects have the
right to resist in all of these cases, and such resistance must include
187
aggressive force in order to be effective.
Importantly, Locke’s reasoning hinged on the idea that even if an
absolutist prince has yet to endanger my person concretely, he might do
188
189
so later on, if he manages to take my liberty or my property, and
therefore I can act against him before a specific threat to life materializes.
Should international law follow the Lockean idea of the right to resort to
force when the democratic entitlement is violated? Returning to the
reductivist approach, some contemporary philosophers claim that
theoretically, individuals as well as collectives can resort to lethal force
against severe deprivation of freedom or subsistence as defense against
190
However, in truth, the vast majority of totalitarian
aggression.
regimes—abhorrent as they might be—do not exercise the same level of
oppression that would justify killing in an individual setting. Most models
Three Years After Libya’s Uprising, AlJazeera (May 19, 2014, 2:29 PM), http://www.aljazeera.com/
indepth/interactive/2014/02/timeline-three-years-after-libya-uprising-201421691755192622.html.
181. See Lieblich, supra note 67, at 219.
182. Locke, supra note 123, chs. 8–9.
183. Id. ch. 7, § 89.
184. Id. ch. 7, §§ 90–93.
185. Id. ch. 3, § 17, ch. 19, § 222.
186. Id. ch. 18, § 199 (defining usurpation and tyranny).
187. Id. ch. 19, § 235 (“He therefore who may resist, must be allowed to strike.”).
188. Id. §§ 16–18 (“I have no reason to suppose, that he, who would take away my liberty, would
not, when he had me in his power, take away everything else. And therefore it is lawful for me to treat
him as one who has put himself into a state of war with me, i.e. kill him if I can.”).
189. Id. ch. 19, §§ 221–22.
190. See, e.g., Fabre, supra note 6, at 105–10, 118–26; McMahan, supra note 116, at 79–81.
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of totalitarian regimes, except the few outright murderous ones, can be
better described as collective forms of “conditional threats”: the regime
directly deprives its citizens of certain political rights, while indirectly
threatening them that resistance would result in a much graver
191
violation. Whether it would be justified to resist upon such “lesser”
threats when knowing that resistance will prompt escalation and thus
192
cause further harm, is an unresolved question in just war theory.
Nonetheless, we can at least agree that when facing such conditional
threats, the victim should attempt a lesser form of resistance—such as
civil disobedience and other nonviolent approaches—before embarking
193
on hostilities as a last resort.
In international legal terms, Locke’s reasoning is reminiscent of the
idea of preventive self-defense on the international level, which justifies
194
a right to act preventatively against emerging threats. However, this
doctrine was rejected by contemporary international legal discourse for
good reasons, chiefly because it raises severe problems of unclear
195
necessity, subjective judgment, abuse, and dangers of escalation. The
Lockean idea clearly raises the same problems. Interestingly, these
concerns were not lost on other classic thinkers who distinguished, when
considering internal force, between cases of illegitimate rule versus cases
of concrete and imminent danger. Grotius, for instance, argued that force
could not be used against usurpers, when the latter do not present an
196
extreme danger. Confronting usurpation, he argued, raises acute
epistemological problems, since such situations are often too complex
197
and “controverted” to allow sound factual judgment. In terms of costbenefit, Grotius argued that it might be preferable to leave the usurper

191. A “conditional threat” is a situation in which A demands of B to suffer harm C, under the
threat that resistance will generate much greater harm D. A classic example of this type of conditional
threat is a simple “your money or your life” street mugging. See Rodin, supra note 111, at 79–88.
192. Rodin claims, for instance, that it could be immoral to resist a lesser threat if we know that
that the indirect grave threat would materialize, since that would make resistance disproportionate in
terms of a cost/benefit analysis. See Rodin, supra note 111, at 81–82. But see Frowe, supra note 110, at
129–45 (arguing that merely “foreseen” conditional harms should be discounted when discussing
proportionality of self-defense; and in collective scenarios, the lesser harms should be considered in
aggregation).
193. See, e.g., Fabre, supra note 110, at 109–11.
194. See Michael W. Doyle, Striking First: Preemption and Prevention in International
Conflict (Stephen Macedo ed., 2008).
195. See Ruys, supra note 134, at 322–24. Interestingly, Locke responds to the problems associated
with preventive use of force by invoking the wisdom of the crowds. Locke believed that people are
capable of such judgments just as private beneficiaries are capable of judging their trustee. Locke,
supra note 123, ch. 19, § 240. Moreover, people are likely to rebel (or to support rebellion) only when
faced with genuine and grave wrongs. Id. ch. 19, §§ 224–25, 230.
196. But see Grotius, supra note 47, at 378–80 (exploring the legality of deposing or killing an usurper).
197. Id. at 381–83.
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“in quiet possession, than engage his country in dangerous troubles and
198
bloody wars.”
Beyond the theoretical legal aspects above, there are additional
practical reasons to reject democracy as the ultimate yardstick to assess
internal resort to force both by states and opposition movements. The
first is the likely objection that the term democracy might be understood
199
as implying Western hegemony. This in itself can irreparably harm the
concept’s legitimacy. Furthermore, even orthodox liberal theory
recognizes that nowadays the democracy and authoritarianism dichotomy
is too simplistic when constructing international relations, and that some
gray areas of legitimacy exist—most notably in the form of the Rawlsian
200
idea of “decent peoples.” But even if we reject such gray areas, the
conceptual ambiguity of democracy remains. Indeed, defining democracy
201
is far from simple, even if we can agree on its basic tenets. As the world
202
is abundant with “flawed” democracies, it is not always clear when the
threshold is crossed. History teaches us to be suspicious concerning the
203
use of the term “democratic” as an empty vessel. Since any rule on the
use of force—considering the stakes at hand—must aim to minimize the
space for subjective interpretation, it should not be constructed around
vague concepts.
Finally, democratic entitlement is a weak analytical tool due to its
collapse into other concepts; that is, unless we mythicize it as a collective,
transcendental right. The term “democracy,” however defined, includes
both procedural (electoral) aspects as well as substantive (rights-based)
204
ones. If we focus on the existence of electoral democracy as a
determinant for a right to use internal force, the resulting rule is
unattractive, since majority rule is not sufficient, in itself, to secure
human rights. If on the other hand, by democracy we do not mean only
electoral process but also the protection of individual rights, then we
inevitably venture into the open textured, culturally sensitive territory of
205
human rights. Absent further elaboration, “human rights” is far too
ambiguous a concept for the regulation of resort to hostilities and, in any

198. Id. at 381. Furthermore, the usurper’s acts might have binding (de facto) power, if not by law
(de jure), simply by the fact that this would be preferable to “anarchy.” Id. at 377; see also Pufendorf,
supra note 52, at 724–26.
199. See Fox & Roth, supra note 167, at 13–15.
200. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples 59–88 (1999).
201. Jan Knippers Black, What Kind of Democracy Does the “Democratic Entitlement” Entail?, in
Democratic Governance and International Law, supra note 166, at 517; Martti Koskenniemi,
Intolerant Democracies: A Reaction, 37 Harv. Int’l L.J. 231, 231–32 (1996).
202. See, e.g., Democracy Index 2013, Economist Intelligence Unit, http://www.eiu.com/public/
topical_report.aspx?campaignid=Democracy0814 (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
203. See Lieblich, supra note 67, at 216.
204. See id. at 210.
205. See id. at 217.
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case, reveals that “democratic entitlement” is not an entirely distinct
206
concept.
IV. Individualist Visions: International Human Rights and Armed
Conflict as a State of Exception
Having demonstrated the failure of several international legal
doctrines to form a basis for a theory of internal jus ad bellum, we can
proceed to discuss ideas rooted in the protection of the individual.
International human rights law seems better situated to control the resort
to force, as it specifically sets out to prevent and curb intrastate violence.
Since it is concerned with the protection of individuals, it fits more
naturally with the revisionist just war ideas underlying our discussion. As
shown in this Part, some contemporary human rights jurisprudence
implies the adoption of the logic of reductivist individualism by applying,
in general, the same norms of resort to force on the micro and macro
207
levels of violence. However, IHRL’s effectiveness in this context is
curbed both by doctrinal underdevelopment and its troubled relations with
international humanitarian law.
A. The Right to Life and Internal Hostilities
IHRL’s potential to prohibit and regulate resort to internal force is
mainly rooted in its protection of everyone’s right to life. Article 6 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), for
208
instance, provides that “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”
209
While no derogation from this right is permitted, the term “arbitrarily”
implies that some exceptions are possible, such as deprivation of life
210
during war. Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(“ECHR”) presents a slightly different approach. It entrenches
211
“everyone’s right to life,” but subjects it to several explicit exceptions.
Thus, Article 2(2) excludes deprivations of life resulting from defense of
212
persons from unlawful violence; from action taken “in order to effect a
213
lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;” or
from “action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or
214
insurrection.” These legitimate aims are limited by a means-ends
206. See id. at 217–19.
207. See William Abresch, A Human Rights Law of Internal Armed Conflict: The European Court
of Human Rights in Chechnya, 16 Eur. J. Int’l L. 741, 742–43 (2005).
208. ICCPR, supra note 93, art. 6(1); see also American Convention on Human Rights art. 4(1)
Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
209. ICCPR, supra note 93, art. 4(2).
210. See infra Part V.
211. ECHR, supra note 176, art. 2(1).
212. Id. art. 2(2)(a).
213. Id. art. 2(2)(b).
214. Id. art. 2(2)(c).
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proportionality constraint: the force used cannot be more “than
215
absolutely necessary.” Furthermore, Article 15 of the ECHR allows
derogations in times of emergency, including from the right to life, only
216
“in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war.” It should
already be clear that the “war” exceptions reflect a dichotomy between
internal peace and war, without clearly regulating the movement between
these realms. I treat this problem in the next section. For now, it suffices
to note that this mirrors the pre-Charter law on international resort to
force, which treated peace and war as two spheres between which a state
217
could move freely.
IHRL can be used to assess the conduct of every state (and as we
shall see, perhaps nonstate). Moreover, even those that deny IHRL’s
application during armed conflict cannot rule out that it applies before
armed conflict erupts. Therefore, there is no doubt that IHRL can
regulate the initial decision to resort to armed force. However, this
potential has been fulfilled only partially, if at all. Granted, IHRL has
been extended to situations of internal armed conflicts by major human
rights courts, notably the European Court of Human Rights
218
(“ECtHR”). In a string of cases relating to the Russian-Chechen
conflict, the court moved to apply IHRL even in relation to core issues of
219
jus in bello. Nonetheless, as demonstrated below, IHRL was not taken
so far as to explicitly regulate the resort to force itself, meaning, the ad
bellum level. If the issue was touched upon, it was only in passing
references. In fact, the move by courts to assess the conduct of hostilities
in light of human rights norms is more than anything a pragmatic
solution to competence problems: IHRL is applied since it is unclear to
220
what extent human rights courts are authorized to apply IHL directly.

215. Id. art. 2(2).
216. Id. art. 15(2).
217. Lieblich, supra note 67, at 74–75.
218. By “extension” I do not refer to the joint application of IHL and IHRL during armed conflict
but rather to the assessment of the conduct of hostilities in light of human rights law in lieu of IHL. See
Andrea Gioia, The Role of the European Court of Human Rights in Monitoring Compliance with
Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict, in Pas de Deux: International Humanitarian Law and
International Human Rights Law 201, 203 (Orna Ben Naftali ed., 2011) (noting that the ECtHR has
often ignored IHL altogether, applying IHRL instead).
219. Id. at 218–20, 224–49.
220. Oona Hathaway et al., Which Law Governs During Armed Conflict? The Relationship
Between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, 96 Minn. L. Rev. 1883, 1909–10
(2012) (arguing that human rights courts exclude IHL due to jurisdictional issues). For a discussion of
the jurisdictional problem in the Inter-American human rights system, see Shana Tabak, Armed
Conflict and the Inter-American Human Rights System: Application or Interpretation of International
Humanitarian Law?, in Applying International Humanitarian Law in Judicial and QuasiJudicial Bodies: International and Domestic Aspects 219 (Derek Jinks et al. eds., 2014), and see
Gioia, supra note 218, at 215–18. Some claim that at least in internal conflicts, applying IHRL can be
desirable, because IHL is less developed than human rights law when it comes to noninternational
armed conflict. Abresch, supra note 207, at 747.
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Moreover, by applying IHRL in lieu of IHL, courts could sidestep the
often controversial question of whether an internal armed conflict
221
existed in a particular situation.
222
The leading case, in this context, is the ECtHR’s Isayeva v. Russia.
In Isayeva, the applicant alleged, inter alia, that Russia violated Article 2
(the right to life) of the ECHR, by indiscriminately bombing the
223
Chechen village of Katyr-Yurt and killing her family members. Russia
responded by invoking Article 2(2)(a), claiming that the bombing was
224
absolutely necessary in defense of persons. It did not, however, claim
that an armed conflict existed; nor did it make any derogation from the
225
right to life, although Article 15’s derogations regime is relevant also to
226
civil wars. This framing allowed the court to analyze the dispute as a
“regular” human rights case.
The court ruled first that the basic values of democratic societies
must restrict the circumstances in which deprivation of life can be
227
justified. In essence, this reflects a baseline of nonuse of force within
intrastate relations, emanating from the general idea of human rights
law. The question then was whether the Katyr-Yurt bombings were
absolutely necessary in defense of persons, as Russia claimed, since in
such a case, deprivation of life might be justified. The court’s analysis of
the question followed a three-tiered approach reflecting, to some extent,
228
jus ad bellum thinking. First, “absolutely necessary” consists, as per the
court, of the need “to minimise, to the greatest extent possible, recourse
229
to lethal force,” and that force must be “strictly proportionate to the
230
achievement of the permitted aims.” This reasoning mirrors traditional
231
jus ad bellum considerations of necessity and proportionality. The
second tier, albeit only implicitly referred to in Isayeva, holds that even
when force can be generally justified, less harmful means must be
considered prior to each attack, even when the targeted individual is

221. Gioia, supra note 218, at 222. IHRL application allows for this sidestep because the existence
of an armed conflict is a precondition for IHL’s application, whereas that is not the case for IHRL.
See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 101, art. 3.
222. 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 791 (2005).
223. Id. ¶¶ 3, 162.
224. Id. ¶ 170.
225. Id. ¶¶ 133, 191.
226. Gioia, supra note 218, at 204.
227. Isayeva, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 172.
228. See Abresch, supra note 207, at 764–65.
229. Isayeva, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 175.
230. Id. ¶ 173.
231. See, e.g., Dapo Akande & Thomas Liefländer, Clarifying Necessity, Imminence and
Proportionality in the Law of Self-Defense, 107 Am. J. Int’l L. 563, 564–68 (2013).
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232

participating in combat. This view essentially breaks down the conduct
of hostilities to a continuous series of ad bellum decisions; there is no
formal “threshold” that once crossed allows the “wholesale” targeting
usually associated with armed conflict under IHL. The third tier
correlates with traditional jus in bello obligations to take precautionary
measures, requiring that once recourse is made to lethal force, steps
233
should be taken to minimize incidental harm to civilians.
The Isayeva court analyzed the first and second tiers in a laconic
manner, which implies significant deference to state discretion. It ruled
that the situation in Chechnya called for “exceptional measures,” in
order to “regain control” over the state and “to suppress the illegal
234
armed insurgency.” Given the circumstances, those measures could
include “the deployment of army units” with heavy weaponry such as
235
warplanes and artillery. At first glance, this seems like a sovereigntycentered, collectivist view of internal resort to force. However, the court
also noted the presence of many Chechen fighters in the village, and
their active resistance to law enforcement, which implied the logic of self236
defense according to individualist standards. The court thus ruled that
Russia might have been justified in resorting to force in the
237
circumstances at hand. Nonetheless, the court’s analysis leaves much to
be desired, as it made only a passing, one-paragraph reference to these
complex issues, before moving on to analyze in greater detail the civilian
238
harm caused by the specific bombing.
Thus, despite the ECtHR’s cautious steps toward limiting internal
239
resorts to force, its jurisprudence does not fully resolve the issue. First,
there is much that remains ambiguous about the inner workings of
Article 2. In terms of just causes for internal force, the court did not
clarify the relation between the collectivist and individualist
understandings of the “absolutely necessary” standard, which it
240
simultaneously offered when discussing Russia’s resort to force. More

232. Isayeva, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 172–75; see Abresch, supra note 207, at 758 (“Even with respect
to persons taking active part in hostilities, the ECHR only permits the use of lethal force when capture
is too risky.”).
233. Isayeva, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 175.
234. Id. ¶ 180.
235. Id.
236. Id. Likewise, the court held that the primary objective of the deployment of heavy weapons
should be “to protect lives from unlawful violence.” Id. ¶ 191.
237. Id. ¶ 180.
238. Specifically, the court considered that no effective warning was given to civilians, that the
weapons used were indiscriminate, and that safe passage for civilians escaping the village was not
ensured. Id. ¶¶ 183–200.
239. See Abresch, supra note 207, at 765–67.
240. The court ruled that “a balance must be achieved between the aim pursued and the means
employed to achieve it,” but it did not make clear whether the “aim pursued” to be assessed is on the
macro (regaining control) or micro (unit self-defense) levels. Isayeva, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 181.
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generally, the court has yet to elaborate on the interaction between the
“defense of persons” exception—explicitly relied upon by Russia in
Isayeva—and the other exceptions under Article 2(2). While the
“defense” exception conforms to the reductive approach, it is doubtful
whether deprivation of life during arrest or quelling a riot or insurrection
can be reconciled with the view that killing could only be justified in selfor-other-defense. Additionally, the court’s reference in Isayeva to
“illegal” insurgency as a justification for force raises the question of
whether it was the specific Chechen uprising which was illegal, or rather
any insurgency per se, and further, whether illegality is to be determined
strictly in light of domestic law or also by reference to international
norms.
Second, it should be remembered that human rights jurisprudence
mainly concerns state action. Although it is obvious that the right to life
must apply in some form between private individuals, existing case law
does not tell us much about the limitations on resort to force by nonstate
241
actors.
Third, and most importantly, it must be recalled that in all relevant
ECtHR cases, the impugned states themselves refrained from claiming
that an internal armed conflict existed within their territories; they did
not file a “civil war” derogation under Article 15. Thus, it is debatable
whether the cautious regulation of resort to force described above would
242
survive if states choose to act otherwise. Recent ECtHR jurisprudence
gives cause for pessimism in this context. In 2014’s landmark Hassan v.
United Kingdom, the court was called to rule on the relation between the
right to liberty entrenched in Article 5 of the ECHR and the rules
243
regulating detention under IHL. The case’s special importance was that
for the first time, the State asked the court to disregard Article 5 in favor
of relevant IHL provisions, or alternatively, to interpret the Article as
accommodating the detention powers provided for in the Third and
244
Although Article 5’s language is
Fourth Geneva Conventions.
exhaustive, the court interpreted it as allowing the more expansive
detention powers available under IHL, even absent derogation by the
245
State to that effect. Importantly, the court emphasized that such an

241. See Abresch, supra note 207, at 753.
242. See Gioia, supra note 218, at 224 (“In situations where Article 15 ECHR is invoked, there can be
no doubt that IHL may be applied in order to determine what constitutes a ‘lawful act of war.’”). Even
absent derogations, some understood the court’s “necessary in a democratic society” limitation as
correlating with the IHL concept of “military necessity” rather than jus ad bellum necessity. See Abresch,
supra note 207, at 766; see also Aisling Reidy, The Approach of the European Commission and Court of
Human Rights to International Humanitarian Law, 80 Int’l Rev. Red Cross 519 (1998).
243. Hassan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 29750/09 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014).
244. Id. ¶ 99.
245. Id. ¶ 104.
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interpretation is only possible when the State appeals to IHL to justify its
246
actions.
Granted, the court stressed that the ruling was limited to
international armed conflicts—where rules of detention are relatively
247
clear. In internal armed conflicts, presumably, the state would at least
be required to lodge a formal derogation in order to justify forms of
detention not envisioned by Article 5. Nonetheless, considering the
power that the court attributed to the existence of an armed conflict in
shaping its interpretation, we can definitely envision a situation in which
for the first time, a state would invoke IHL in an internal conflict—or
lodge a derogation—and thus bypass even the modest steps the court has
made in Isayeva in favor of limiting internal resorts to force.
The implication of the above is that under positive IHRL, the
existence of an internal armed conflict could be used as a proxy for the
lawfulness of resorting to force. This is because the factual existence of
an armed conflict is commonly understood to effect a switch between the
spheres of “peace” and “war,” which in turn ushers in a normative
change. However, under this understanding, IHRL does not regulate the
248
terms of the paradigm switch itself: it merely recognizes it. In a sense,
when these dynamics occur, normative issues of jus ad bellum collapse
into factual questions of jus in bello; and jus in bello, in turn, undermines
the possibility of an IHRL-based regulation of internal jus ad bellum.
The next subpart elaborates on this problematic outcome.
B. The Collapse into the “Armed Conflict” Discourse
1.

The Emergence of the “Armed Conflict” Discourse as a Proxy for
Jus ad Bellum in Noninternational Armed Conflicts

Following the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the
ensuing U.S.-led “global war on terror,” the legal regulation of the use of
force between states and nonstate actors became a dominant issue in
international discourse. At first, the key question was whether states
enjoyed the right, under jus ad bellum, to exercise transnational self249
250
defense against nonstate actors. While some controversy still remains,

246. Id. ¶ 107.
247. Id. ¶ 104; see also Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne, The Grand Chamber Judgment in Hassan v. UK,
EJIL Talk! (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-grand-chamber-judgment-in-hassan-v-uk/.
248. See, e.g., Abresch, supra note 207, at 745 n.11 (citing G.I.A.D. Draper, Human Rights and the
Law of War, 12 Va. J. Int’l L. 326, 338 (1972) (arguing that war is an “exceptional situation” resulting
in derogation from the human rights system)).
249. For an outline of state practice regarding this question before 9/11, see Ruys, supra note 134,
at 42133; see also Carsten Stahn, Terrorist Acts as “Armed Attack”: The Right to Self-Defense, Article
51(1/2) of the UN Charter, and International Terrorism, 27 Fletcher Forum World Aff. 35 (2003)
(discussing the impact of the events of September 11th on the right to self-defense).
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state practice and most mainstream writers now accept that in some
cases, cross-border forcible action against nonstate actors can be justified
251
under the right to self-defense.
However, as the “war on terror” lingered, it became increasingly
difficult to trace this or that forcible action to any previous or imminent
armed attack, and to define the geographical boundaries of this so-called
252
“war.” The main question became whether the law of armed conflict
applied at all in the various arenas where the United States operated.
Two conflicting interest groups answered this question in the negative.
The Bush administration argued that transnational conflicts—being
neither international nor internal—are not subject to the constraints of
253
the law of armed conflict to begin with. It suffices to point out, for our
254
purposes, that the U.S. Supreme Court soon discarded this approach.
Nonetheless, many in the international human rights community also
argued that IHL did not apply to the war on terror—but from an entirely
different angle: it did not apply because the various struggles comprising
255
it did not amount to an armed conflict.
The focus of the international human rights community on the
existence of an armed conflict for the purpose of drawing normative
conclusions—a tendency that I call the “armed conflict” discourse—
reflects a significant shift in the general role of IHL within the
international legal system. Shortly put, the shift is between viewing IHL
as a constraining normative system (in relation to a generally enabling,

250. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 139 (July 9) [hereinafter Wall Advisory Opinion]. But see id.
Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins ¶ 33; Declaration of Judge Buergenthal ¶ 6; Sean D. Murphy, SelfDefense and the Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion: An Ipse Dixit from the I.C.J.? 99 Am. J. Int’l L. 62
(2005); see also Iain Scobbie, Words My Mother Never Taught Me—“In Defense of the International
Court,” 99 Am. J. Int’l L. 76 (2005).
251. S.C. Res. 1368 (Sept. 12, 2001); S.C. Res. 1373 (Sept. 28, 2001); see also Ruys, supra note 134,
at 443–510; Daniel Betlehem, Principles Relevant to the Scope of a State’s Right of Self-Defense Against
an Imminent or Actual Attack by Nonstate Actors, 106 Am. J. Int’l L. 1 (2012); Kress, supra note 11, at
43–51. At least one commentator raised the possibility that the right to self-defense against nonstate
actors is mirrored by a prohibition on the use of force by such actors. See Nicholas Tsagourias, NonState Actors in International Peace and Security: Non-State Actors and the Use of Force, in
Participants in the International Legal System 326, 326–33 (Jean d’Aspremont ed., 2011). Others
have argued for such a prohibition, but only on targeting of civilians. See Anne-Marie Slaughter &
William Burke-White, An International Constitutional Moment, 43 Harv. Int’l L. J. 1, 2 (2002).
252. Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the Law of
Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. Penn. L. Rev. 675, 677–80 (2004).
253. Id. at 682.
254. In the Hamdan case, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the struggle between the United
States and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan was a noninternational armed conflict, subject to the provisions
of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 631–32 (2006).
255. See Philip Alston (Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions),
Study on Targeted Killings, ¶¶ 53–56, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010); see also
Ehrenreich Brooks, supra note 252, at 679–80; Luban, supra note 125, at 29.
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256

Lotus-based freedom to act) and its perception as an enabling system
(in relation to the constraining background of IHRL). Since this point is
paramount to understanding how IHL undermines internal jus ad
bellum, it is worthwhile to elaborate on this process further.
Indeed, the distinction between civil unrest, regarding which the
laws of war do not apply, and civil wars—in which these laws kick in—is
257
as old as IHL itself. However, in the past, this distinction mainly served
to entrench state sovereignty. The default rule was that domestic strife,
as an issue between the state and its subjects, was beyond the reach of
258
international law altogether. Only when the opposition exhibited statelike qualities—namely, by conducting organized hostilities and exercising
effective control over territory—could sovereignty be compromised by
259
subjecting an otherwise internal situation to international law. This was
the backdrop for the factual criteria for the existence of noninternational
260
armed conflicts, adopted later in Protocol II, and by the International
261
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia. Since the alternative was freedom of
action, states were incentivized not to recognize that an armed conflict
262
existed, while rebels were motivated to do exactly the opposite.
Nowadays, however, when an armed conflict does not exist,
international law is not mute. Rather, the more restrictive normative
framework of IHRL applies alone. Under IHRL, institutional violence is
restricted to the “law enforcement” paradigm, which severely restricts
deprivation of life to situations where an imminent threat is
263
determined. Conversely, during armed conflict the more permissive
264
paradigm of “hostilities,” regulated by IHL, steps to the fore.

256. The famous Lotus principle holds that in general, states are free to act in absence of an
express constraining norm. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 ¶ 44 (Sept. 7).
257. See supra note 81.
258. See supra Part I.B.
259. See supra note 81.
260. Protocol II, supra note 20, art. 1.
261. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
262. See Sandesh Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict 200–04
(2012). As Baxter stated in 1974 “the first line of defense against international humanitarian law, is to
deny that it applies at all.” Richard Baxter, Some Existing Problems in Humanitarian Law, in The
Concept of International Armed Conflict: Further Outlook 1, 2 (Proceedings of the International
Symposium on Humanitarian Law, 1974), reprinted in Commemoration of the Centenary of the
Brussels Declaration of 1874 on the Laws and Customs of War, 14 Mil. L. & L. War Rev. 271 (1971).
This explains, for instance, the reluctance by the Union, during the American Civil War to recognize
that the conflict was a “war” in the legal sense, while the Confederacy claimed full belligerent rights.
See Neff, supra note 165, at 7, 15–16. This also explains why the belligerency doctrine has generally
fallen into desuetude. See Lieblich, supra note 67, at 82–83, 122.
263. Basic Principles, supra note 21, art. 9.
264. I set aside the general question of the relation between IHRL and IHL during hostilities. See
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 ¶¶ 24–25 (July
8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion]; Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 250, ¶¶ 102,

Lieblich-67.3.docx (Do Not Delete)

732

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

3/21/2016 10:20 PM

[Vol. 67:687

Combatants and other unprotected persons can be lethally targeted, and
collateral damage to uninvolved civilians is tolerated in circumstances
265
much wider than the conventional understanding of IHRL allows. The
factual existence of armed conflict was thus phrased as a precondition for
the switch between the ordinary human rights law of peacetime and the
266
“state of exception” of the laws of war. IHL, then, becomes a defense:
as stated bluntly by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights—
“humanitarian law may be a defense available to a State to rebut charged
267
As the
violations of human rights during internal hostilities.”
international human rights regime becomes stronger, the traditional
incentive system will be reversed. Under these circumstances, it becomes
clear that to enhance their freedom of action, states have at least some
incentive to classify a situation as an armed conflict, while nonstate
268
actors might argue the opposite.
Arguably, the roots of this reversal of incentives can be traced to the
269
ICJ’s 1994 Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion. There, among many
other questions, the court considered the relations between IHL and
Article 6(1) of the ICCPR, which prohibits, as discussed above, the

105 (Jul. 9, 2004). For a discussion and critique see Marko Milanović, Norm Conflicts, International
Humanitarian Law, and Human Rights Law, in Pas de Deux, supra note 218, at 95–125.
265. Ehrenreich Brooks, supra note 252, at 676, 692; Luban, supra note 125, at 29; see also Lieblich,
supra note 15, at 364–72 (detailing the differences between the law enforcement and hostilities
paradigms); Michael N. Schmitt, Drone Attacks Under the Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello: Clearing the
“Fog of Law”, 13 Y.B. Int’l Hum. L. 311, 319 (2010); see, e.g., Laurie R. Blank & Benjamin R. Farley,
Characterizing U.S. Operations in Pakistan: Is the U.S. Engaged in an Armed Conflict, 34 Fordham
Int’l L.J. 151 (2011); Mary Ellen O’Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of
Pakistan, 2004-2009, in Shooting to Kill: Socio-Legal Perspectives on the Use of Lethal Force
263, 290–91 (Simon Bronitt ed., 2012) (arguing that targeted killings by the United States in Pakistan
were unlawful, inter alia, since there was no armed conflict); Mary Ellen O’Connell, When Is War Not
a War? The Myth of the Global War on Terror, 12 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. L. 535 (2006); International
Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic (Stanford Law School) and Global Justice
Clinic (NYU School of Law), Living Under Drones: Death, Injury, and Trauma to Civilians
from US Drone Practices in Pakistan 110–118 (2012); see also Nils Melzer, Targeted Killing in
International Law 224, 243–47 (2008).
266. See Jens David Ohlin, The Crime of Bootstrapping, in The Crime of Aggression: A
Commentary (Claus Kress & Stefan Barriga eds., forthcoming) (on file with author).
267. Avilán v. Colombia, Case 11.142, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 26/97,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 168 (1998). As Ohlin argues, therefore, once IHL kicks in, critics of
armed violence “have largely lost the legal debate” and that the choice of legal framework is usually
“outcome determinative.” Ohlin, supra note 19, at 2 (making this claim in the context of targeted
killings).
268. See David Kretzmer, Rethinking the Application of IHL in Non-International Armed
Conflicts, 42 Isr. L. Rev. 8, 39 (2009) (noting that given the development of IHRL, categorization of a
situation as an armed conflict may grant states more leeway). When considering this incentive system,
it is also noteworthy that once “war” exists, executives also enjoy significant leeway according to some
domestic systems. In the American context, see for example, Deborah N. Pearlstein, Law at the End of
War, 99 Minn. L. Rev. 143, 143–50 (2014).
269. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 264.
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270

arbitrary deprivation of life. The court famously set forth a lex specialis
test, holding that during armed conflict, the term “arbitrary” is
271
determined by reference to what is lawful under IHL. When this
reasoning is applied in the internal sphere, however—absent another rule
of internal jus ad bellum—the existence of an armed conflict becomes
also a measure for the decision to resort to armed force. For all practical
purposes, jus in bello becomes a proxy for questions of jus ad bellum.
Indeed, although most of the “armed conflict” discourse took place
in the context of transnational forcible actions conducted by the United
States, it quickly became interwoven with the question of internal
forcible action. This is because once a territorial government was
involved in an armed conflict against opposition groups, it could, in
272
general, consent to forcible intervention by third parties. Thus, for
instance, even if there was no direct, armed conflict between the United
States and militants in other states, consensual forcible actions by the
former could still be justified if there was an armed conflict inside the
273
target state. Under this paradigm, external jus ad bellum, too, becomes
subordinated to a jus in bello determination on the internal level.
274
The famous Abella v. Argentina case, decided by the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights (“Commission”), is a clear
example for the obfuscation of ad bellum and in bello considerations in
275
internal settings. In 1989, forty-two armed individuals stormed an
Argentinian infantry base, La Tablada. Fighting lasted thirty hours and
resulted in over thirty casualties, as Argentinian forces took back the
276
base by military force. The petitioners, among them relatives of the
attackers who lost their lives, challenged the lawfulness of the forcible
277
response by the State. Interestingly, one of the petitioners’ main
arguments strongly corresponded with a jus ad bellum argument: a coup
d’etat was planned in La Tablada, and in such case, the Argentinian
Constitution authorized citizens to take up arms, while the State’s
278
forcible response was unlawful. The forcible response by the State was
“unnecessary” and “disproportionate,” as the government should have

270. Id.
271. Id. ¶ 25.
272. Lieblich, supra note 67, at 3.
273. Id. at 157–58.
274. Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 55/97,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. (1998).
275. The Inter-American Human Rights System, in general, was more willing to apply or interpret
IHL norms than other systems. For a useful analysis, see Tabak, supra note 220.
276. Abella, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 55/97 ¶ 1.
277. They also claimed that after the fighting, captured attackers were executed, tortured, or
disappeared, in violation of their right to life and due process guarantees. Id. ¶¶ 3–6. See Tabak, supra
note 220, at 234–37.
278. Abella, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 55/97 ¶¶ 1–2, 7, 172.
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addressed the situation by law enforcement measures and not by
279
hostilities.
As common in the “armed conflict” discourse, the Commission first
determined whether an armed conflict existed in order to determine
280
whether IHL kicks in or whether IHRL applies alone. It quickly
concluded that the incident at La Tablada amounted to an armed
281
conflict, despite its brief duration :
What differentiates the events at the La Tablada base from these
situations [internal disturbances] are the concerted nature of the
hostile acts undertaken by the attackers, the direct involvement of
governmental armed forces, and the nature and level of the violence
attending the events in question. More particularly, the attackers . . .
executed an armed attack, i.e., a military operation, against a
quintessential military objective—a military base. The officer in charge
of the La Tablada base sought, as was his duty, to repulse the attackers,
and President Alfonsín, exercising his constitutional authority . . .
ordered that military action be taken to recapture the base and subdue
282
the attackers.

In its determination of the existence of an armed conflict, the
Commission, besides applying standard IHL tests of intensity, adopted
language that implied a jus ad bellum discourse: the petitioners conducted
an “armed attack,” and the government sought to repel it, perhaps in self283
defense. One cannot but notice the Commission’s approval of such action,
by its emphasis on the duty to “repulse” the attackers. The petitioners
284
conversely, “clearly assumed the risk of a military response.” Arguably,
jus ad bellum considerations informed the Commission’s decision that, in
fact, an armed conflict existed—but since internal jus ad bellum remains a
blank spot in positive law, this reasoning is concealed in jus in bello
discourse.
This concealment allowed the Commission, when moving to apply
the law, to summarily reject the petitioners’ internal jus ad bellum claims
on the basis that once an armed conflict exists, IHL steps in, and as such,
it is blind to “the legitimacy of the reasons or the cause” for which arms

279. Id. ¶¶ 10–11.
280. Id. ¶¶ 147, 151.
281. Id. ¶ 156.
282. Id. ¶ 155 (emphasis added).
283. Id. The Commission has followed a similar route in the Avilán case. See Avilán v. Colombia,
Case 11.142, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 26/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 133 (1998)
(holding that since an internal armed conflict exists in Colombia, “the Colombian State has the full
right to defend itself from violent actions that may be taken against it, and to take military actions
against . . . irregular armed groups”).
284. Abella, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 55/97 ¶ 179.
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285

were taken up. It thereafter proceeded to assess the state’s conduct in
286
light of IHL, finding, in general, no fault.
Indeed, this reasoning could seem like an elegant solution. After all,
its underlying logic is compelling: armed hostilities are undertaken where
a state, in fact, cannot resort to its regular justice system to confront the
challenge and establish order. Already in the seventeenth century,
Edward Coke observed that the interruption of “the peaceable course of
287
justice” was precisely the watershed between internal peace and war.
However, relying on factual jus in bello determinations as a proxy for jus
ad bellum muddles the discourse. On its own, jus in bello is ill-equipped
to address questions of this order both in its structure and theoretical
underpinnings; most notably, it pays no mind to the ethical standards for
killing, explored earlier on. Because of the centrality of the “armed
conflict” discourse in international legal argument, it is worthwhile to
explore these problems in some detail.
2.

The Circularity of the “Armed Conflict” Discourse

The first problem of the “armed conflict” discourse is its circularity:
the existence of an armed conflict is determined through thresholds
established by IHL itself, without explicit reference to an external
Archimedean point. Now, because these thresholds are strictly factual,
IHL’s normative potential to supplant questions of jus ad bellum is
288
severely limited. At most, they can only identify, but not regulate, the
switch between the legal paradigms of law enforcement and hostilities. In
a sense, using IHL as a proxy for jus ad bellum is a legal exception that
establishes itself without regard to the general rule or the values it is
purposed to ensure. Deducing a right to resort to force from an existence
of an armed conflict, simply put, confuses “is” with “ought,” fact and
289
norm. Indeed, this situation brings about an awkward, circular result: a
state is justified to resort to hostilities when hostilities exist. This, of
course, enhances the risk of abuse. States could unilaterally raise the
intensity of internal unrest, and then proceed to invoke the fact that an
armed conflict exists in order to justify the hostilities, thus bypassing

285. Id. ¶ 173. The Commission has also ruled that the motives of the petitioners, as individuals,
are issues of domestic law. Id. ¶ 175.
286. Id. ¶¶ 176–89. It should be added that the Commission’s competence to directly apply IHL
was heavily criticized in later rulings, and might not reflect the lex lata in the Inter-American system.
Tabak, supra note 220, at 230–32.
287. Neff, supra note 165, at 40.
288. See Abresch, supra note 207, at 765 (“[H]umanitarian law is agnostic regarding the legality of
the aims [of the resort to force] themselves.”).
289. See, e.g., Stanley L. Paulson, Hans Kelsen’s Earliest Legal Theory, in Norms and Normativity:
Critical Reflections on Kelsenian Themes 23, 29 (Stanley L. Paulson & Bonnie Litschewski
Paulson eds., 1998).
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their human rights commitments. Under such an incentive system,
states can manipulate their way into an armed conflict through acts on
the ground, thus gaining the de facto right to conduct hostilities while
291
bearing no material legal costs.
The problem of circularity reaches further. As aforementioned, it
spawns consequences for external jus ad bellum, since when an internal
armed conflict exists within a state, it can generally consent to third-party
292
forcible intervention. This is the case, for instance, in the recent action
by the United States against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
293
(“ISIL”) in Iraq, conducted upon the request of the Iraqi Government,
as well as the ongoing campaign in Yemen against Houthi rebels, in
which Arab states explicitly invoked the consent of Yemen’s embattled
294
president. Now, although intervening states might provide additional
justifications for such actions—for instance, invoking an ambiguous claim
295
of self-defense —in legal terms, governmental consent can often act as a
standalone justification for transnational use of force, at least as long as
the requesting government is recognized. If the existence of an armed
conflict is enough to justify internal uses of force, and consequentially
also external involvement, external parties do not need to substantively
justify their intervention beyond the governmental consent they have
296
received. The potential of external forcible support, in turn, generates
further incentives for governments to abuse the armed conflict discourse.
3.

The Normative Limitations of Jus in Bello as a Proxy for Jus ad
Bellum

Circularity is not the only shortcoming of the “armed conflict”
discourse. Another is IHL’s limitations as a normative system, which
290. Alston, supra note 255, ¶¶ 47–48; see also Lieblich, supra note 67, at 50 (pointing out such
possible dynamics in the early stages of the Syrian crisis).
291. Indeed, nowadays, being recognized as a party to an internal armed conflict—beyond in
narrow circumstances—does not result in any material advantage to opposition groups, but only to
states. Members of armed groups can be targeted under the hostilities paradigm, but have no right to
participate in hostilities and can thus be prosecuted in accordance with domestic law. See, e.g., Nils
Melzer, Int’l Comm. Red Cross, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in
Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law 84 (2009).
292. See supra note 268.
293. U.S. Military Conducts Airstrikes in Support of Dam Operations, U.S. Dep’t of Def. (Sept. 7,
2014), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=123103.
294. Saudi and Arab Allies Bomb Houthi Positions in Yemen, AlJazeera (Mar. 26, 2015),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2015/03/saudi-ambassador-announces-military-operationyemen-150325234138956.html.
295. See, e.g., U.S. Military Conducts Airstrikes in Support of Dam Operations, supra note 293
(arguing that the strikes were conducted also “to protect U.S. personnel and facilities”). On the
relations between self-defense and consent as jus ad bellum justifications, see Lieblich, supra note 67,
at 14–18.
296. For a critique of this result and a suggestion for reform, see Ashley S. Deeks, Consent to the
Use of Force and International Law Supremacy, 54 Harv. J. Int’l L.J. 1 (2013).
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emanates from its relatively modest aspirations. Indeed, since they deal
with killing, both jus ad bellum and jus in bello are nonideal theories—
meaning, they aim to minimize the evil of a given problematic
297
situation. However, a key difference between them remains. Assuming
full compliance, jus ad bellum achieves a morally ideal situation in which
resort to war is eliminated. Conversely, jus in bello—even if universally
followed to the letter—still remains the lesser evil, since it only aims to
298
regulate wars and mitigate their harm, rather than to prevent them. If
the international law on the use of force sets out to “save succeeding
299
generations from the scourge of war,” IHL does not attempt to do so.
300
Rather, it seeks to alleviate “as much as possible the calamities of war.”
Indeed, under jus in bello, it is possible to envision an atrocious war
in terms of harm to combatants and civilians, which would nevertheless
be perfectly legal if the principles of distinction and proportionality are
301
followed. Following the work of David Kennedy, Gabriella Blum
302
dubbed these dynamics as the “numbing effects” of IHL. Once entering
the realm of IHL, the discussion takes violence as a given and reverts to a
303
seemingly technical discussion: Which rules govern detention? What
304
constitutes effective warning? What are the limits of lawful collateral
305
damage? However, questions relating to the necessity or proportionality
306
of the resort to force itself do not even surface. Indeed, these dynamics
can occur also in international conflicts—in which jus ad bellum is part of
positive law. This might be due to the heavily politicized nature of jus ad

297. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 7–8 (6th ed. 2003).
298. See Marco Sassòli et al., How Does Law Protect in War? chs. 1–2 (3d ed. 2011); Luban,
supra note 125, at 2.
299. U.N. Charter pmbl.
300. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400
Grammes Weight, Saint Petersburg, 29 November/11 December 1868 pmbl. [hereinafter St.
Petersburg Declaration] (emphasis added).
301. This is because IHL traditionally holds that combatants can always be targeted (unless they
are hors de combat), while civilians and civilian objects can only be harmed as proportional “collateral
damage.” See Gary D. Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in
War 251, 272–80 (2010); see also Dill, supra note 127, at 262 (“[IHL] cannot guarantee a moral
standard in the outcome of the confrontation or even prejudge that outcome . . . [it] leaves the moral
question about war unanswered.”).
302. See Blum, supra note 18, at 74 n.6.
303. See, e.g., Ryan Goodman, Editorial Comment: The Detention of Civilians in Armed Conflict,
103 Am. J. Int’l L. 48 (2009). For a recent case, see Serdar Mohammed v. Secretary of State for
Defence [2015] EWCA (Civ) 843 ¶¶ 164–251 (Eng.).
304. Pnina Sharvit Baruch & Noam Neuman, Warning Civilians Prior to Attack Under
International Law: Theory and Practice, 87 Int’l Legal Stud. 359 (2011).
305. Ziv Bohrer & Mark Osiel, Proportionality in Military Force at War’s Multiple Levels: Averting
Civilian Casualties vs. Safeguarding Soldiers, 46 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 747 (2013).
306. See Chase Madar, Short Cuts, 37 London Rev. Books 16 (2015) (arguing that “jus in bello has
swallowed jus ad bellum whole”).
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bellum and the famous “flight from politics” prevalent in international
308
legal discourse. However, international law at least provides the
language to discuss such issues on the interstate level, while evading
them entirely internally.
It is important to understand, in this context, the difference between
necessity and proportionality in the jus ad bellum and jus in bello levels,
as these differences highlight the weakness of using the latter as a proxy
for the former. Traditionally, necessity under jus ad bellum pertains
chiefly to considerations of last resort and immediacy; namely, it asks
309
whether peaceful means to resolve the conflict are reasonably available.
Necessity under jus in bello, conversely, accepts force as a given and only
aims to ensure that it is used for legitimate ends of warfare, meaning,
310
weakening the military forces of the enemy. As such, it is generally
oblivious to the killing of combatants. Proportionality, under jus ad
bellum, scrutinizes the amount of force employed when countering the
311
armed attack. Jus in bello proportionality, on the other hand, is
oblivious to the scope of military operations on the whole and focuses on
312
the incidental harm to civilians caused by a specific attack. Owing to
these material differences, it is hard to see how in bello can effectively
substitute ad bellum on the internal level. Of course, one method to
bypass these limitations is by interpreting IHL in such a constraining
manner, which if followed, would severely restrict military operations to
begin with, thus achieving effects similar to a prohibition on the use of
313
force. But this route has its own significant costs. As Michael Walzer
notes, such constraints taken to the extreme essentially introduce pacifist
considerations into the conduct of armed forces—a clear contradiction in
314
terms. If IHL becomes perceived by belligerents in such a manner,
315
there is significant danger that it will be discredited altogether.
307. See, e.g., Robert D. Sloane, The Cost of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism of Jus ad Bellum
and Jus in Bello in the Contemporary Law of War, 34 Yale J. Int’l L. 47, 102 (2009). For instance, as
is well known, the U.N. Security Council found that an international use of force amounted to an
aggression only in rare instances. See, e.g., Carrie McDougall, The Crime of Aggression Under the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 83–87 (2013). Interestingly, it has also been the
policy of leading human rights NGOs to refrain from dealing with jus ad bellum. See Madar, supra
note 306, at 16.
308. Cf. Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law, 1 Eur. J. Int’l L. 4–7 (1990).
309. See, e.g., Ruys, supra note 134, at 95.
310. St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 300 (“[T]he only legitimate object which States should
endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy.”).
311. Ruys, supra note 134, at 110 (“[I]n terms if the jus ad bellum, it is the forceful response as a
whole that must be scrutinized.”).
312. Protocol I, supra note 147, arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(ii).
313. See, e.g., Aerial Drone Deployment on 4 October 2010 in Mir Ali/Pakistan, Decision to
Terminate Proceedings, 157 I.L.R. 722, 745 (2013) (Ger.) (claiming that “the underlying spirit” of IHL
includes imposing “maximum possible constraints on war per se”).
314. Michael Walzer. Arguing About War 13–14 (2004); Michael Walzer, Coda: Can the Good
Guys Win? 24 Eur. J. Int’l L. 433, 439 (2013) (arguing that a restrictive view of in bello
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Equal Application, the Absence of Fault, and Accountability Gap

Last, the “armed conflict” discourse effectively silences any
meaningful legal discussion on the fault and accountability of leaders and
senior commanders concerning the resort to force. First, assuming that
parties adhere to IHL during the conflict, then according to positive law,
any discussion of responsibility is quashed, owing to the basic principle of
equal application of IHL: in order to minimize war’s inherent inhumanity
316
and for the practical need to prevent a race to the bottom, IHL
317
(generally) applies equally to all parties, whether “just” or “unjust.”
Thus, absent a true doctrine of internal jus ad bellum, once an armed
conflict exists, parties can proceed with the killing, and as long as they do
not violate the laws of war, nobody can be held accountable on the
international level for instigating the conflict, either on the level of state
responsibility or on that of criminal liability. This results in a glaring gap
in the protection of the right to life of both soldiers and armed
opposition members, as well as civilians that can be incidentally harmed:
their lives are simply not a matter for international law to consider. In
interstate conflict, conversely, there is at least the conceptual possibility
318
of state responsibility—through the prohibition on the use of force —
and, in the long run, also of criminal accountability, through the
319
international crime of aggression. Only a theoretical understanding of
internal jus ad bellum could fill this gap on the internal level.
Even when violations of IHL do take place, relying on jus in bello
alone results in an accountability gap in relation to political leaders of
states as well as of armed groups. As most jus in bello decisions are taken
on an operational level, keeping the analysis on this level “kicks-down”
the level of accountability. This is true not only regarding reputation
costs—leaders and senior commanders can always deny involvement in
war crimes committed by armed forces and thus distance themselves
from atrocities—but also concerning the possibility of criminal liability.
This is especially so when considering the recent weakening of doctrines
proportionality “sometimes serves as the functional equivalent of pacifism”); see also Luban, supra
note 125, at 29–31 (criticizing the “overextension” of human rights thinking which amount to the
denial of armed conflicts’ salient characteristics).
315. See Walzer, supra note 314, at 433–34, 439 (noting military lawyers often argue that the
“credibility” of IHL is crucial for its application). See, e.g., Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost:
Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guidance, 42
N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 641, at 690–91 (2010).
316. See, e.g., Walzer, supra note 314, at 439.
317. Gabriella Blum, On a Differential Law of War, 52 Harv. Int’l L.J. 163, 168 (2011). The
principle of equal application has been heavily criticized, on the moral level, by revisionist theorists.
See McMahan, supra note 116, at 1–19. However, even they concede that as a matter of pragmatics
and positive law the principle is currently indispensable. Id. at 104–10.
318. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
319. Assuming the Rome Statue’s definition of the crime of aggression enters into force. For an
overview, see McDougall, supra note 307, at 1–31.
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such as “joint criminal enterprise” and aiding and abetting (the “specific
direction” requirement) in some of the recent rulings of the International
320
Criminal Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”).
In sum, as demonstrated in this Part, while IHRL provides a
possible conceptual framework for an ethically defendable doctrine of
internal jus ad bellum, there is a constant threat of collapse into the
“armed conflict” discourse. The latter, unfortunately, cannot serve as an
effective proxy. It is clear thus that more work must be done in order to
augment IHRL as a relevant regime for the prohibition and regulation of
internal force.
V. Toward a Working Doctrine of Internal JUS AD BELLUM
So far, this Article has outlined the general ethical framework for a
theory of internal jus ad bellum, equally applicable to states and
opposition, based on the idea that resort to hostilities can only be permitted
in self-defense. Moving to international law, I then demonstrated that
collectivist doctrines do not satisfy this framework and also raise a host
of other problems. Moving to the individualist discourse of IHRL, I
pointed out its potential to regulate the resort to internal hostilities
through its defense of the right to life, but also noted why contemporary
doctrine and jurisprudence raise concerns as to its effectiveness in this
context. Finally, I addressed the problematic dynamics between IHRL and
IHL that further undermine IHRL’s potency to fulfill this role. In this
final Part, I explore what would be needed in order for IHRL to do so.
Of course, these suggestions are by no means exhaustive, rather they
serve as a departure point for further discussion and development.
A. The Right to Life as a Prohibition on the First Resort to
Hostilities
First, for IHRL to serve as a functional doctrine of internal jus ad
bellum, it should be clarified that resort to internal hostilities can only be
undertaken in self-or-other-defense against a prior use of force amounting
to hostilities. In terms of legal technique, this poses no special challenges.
Article 6(1) of the ICCPR can easily serve as a baseline for the
prohibition on the resort to internal hostilities, as it protects every human
being, including soldiers, members of opposition groups, as well as

320. Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 89–98 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 2012) (regarding joint criminal enterprise); Prosecutor v. Perisić, Case
No. IT-04-81-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 25–36 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013)
(requiring “specific direction” in aiding and abetting crimes). But see Prosecutor v. Sainović, Case No.
IT-05-87-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 1649–50 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 23, 2014) (ruling
the opposite). For an analysis of these decisions, see Marko Milanović, The Self-Fragmentation of the
ICTY Appeals Chamber, EJIL: Talk! (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-self-fragmentationof-the-icty-appeals-chamber/.
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uninvolved persons that might suffer the consequences of any armed
conflict, even if conducted lawfully under IHL. Considering the object
321
and purpose of the ICCPR, there is no reason to analyze the exception
to the right to life manifested in the “arbitrarily” caveat, by reference
only to the norms of IHL during active hostilities and not to the decision
to resort to hostilities itself. If the right to life is understood this way, we
can phrase the following normative conclusion: If a decision is made to
resort to hostilities in absence of a threat to life or limb comparable in its
scale and effects to that emanating from armed hostilities, then the
ensuing killings could be considered as arbitrary deprivations of life—
322
even if they do not violate IHL per se.
The situation is more complicated when considering IHRL treaties
such as the ECHR, which permit the deprivation of life in specific
circumstances. Nonetheless, a similar understanding is not beyond
conventional legal reasoning. Article 2(1) of the ECHR, which entrenches
the right to life, can be viewed as establishing the prohibition on the resort
to internal hostilities, while Article 2(2) provides exceptions. Article
2(2)(a) refers to the “defence of any person from unlawful violence,”
which fits neatly with the idea that resort to hostilities can be conducted
only in self-or-other-defense. The term “unlawful” provides enough
interpretational leeway to argue that first resort to hostilities, by any
person or entity is prohibited, and that only such cases give rise to the
right to act in self-defense. The main challenge, however, is posed by the
exceptions outlined in Articles 2(2)(c) and the derogations regime
enshrined in Article 15(2). Article 2(2)(c) refers to the “action lawfully
323
taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.” As discussed
earlier, the ECtHR glossed over the question of whether a state is
effectively entitled to resort to hostilities to quash every insurrection,
324
even if instigated by acts of the state itself. Nonetheless, the term
“lawfully” can play a key role here also, if interpreted in its context, and
in light of the provisions of said Article 2(2)(a), which require that
325
deprivation of life be a result of self-or-other-defense. Thus, the
“insurrection” exclusion can be reasonably understood as excluding
decisions to resort to hostilities in order to quell an insurrection, only if
the resort to force is a defensive action. In the same vein, Article 15(2),
which addresses derogations from the right to life in times of war, refers
to the “lawful” acts of war. Again, there is no reason to restrict the

321. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, ¶ 1, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
322. Cf. Basic Principles, supra note 21, art. 9.
323. ECHR, supra note 176, art. 2, ¶ 2(c).
324. See supra p. 730.
325. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 321, art. 31 ¶¶ 1–2. The same
reasoning can apply to the interpretation of Article 2, ¶ 2(b) of the ECHR, supra note 176, which
permits deprivation of life when attempting to effect a “lawful” arrest.
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understanding of the term to lawful in bello actions, as it can be plausibly
constructed to refer also to the decision to resort to hostilities itself.
B. Necessity, Proportionality, and the Meaning of Thresholds
Furthermore, the exceptions to right to life are limited by necessity
and proportionality limitations, which mirror, to a large extent, the same
limitations applying in external jus ad bellum. The term “arbitrarily,”
enshrined in Article 6(1) of the ICCPR, has been understood as implying
a “last resort” requirement—essentially, a necessity condition—as well as
326
means-end and less-extreme-measures proportionality standards.
Similarly, as discussed above, Article 2(2) of the ECHR restricts the
exceptions to the right to life to “use of force which is no more than
327
absolutely necessary,” which implies the same standards.
Applied to the issue at hand, the key question is under which
circumstances can resort to massive armed violence in the form of
hostilities be viewed as a necessary and proportionate action for the
purpose of self-or-other-defense. The answer must be that these
circumstances can only include situations in which the threat to self or
others emanates from actions amounting to hostilities themselves.
Possibly, a viable rule of thumb, already existing in international law, is
that the scale and effects of such actions must at least mirror that of an
“armed attack”—whether against civilians or armed forces—on the
328
international level. A recent example could be the July 2015 highly
sophisticated assault by ISIL-linked militants against the Egyptian army
329
in north Sinai. In other cases, either law enforcement measures, or—
330
from the point of view of opposition—nonviolent resistance can suffice.

326. See Basic Principles, supra note 21, arts. 3–4, 9. For an elaboration on necessity and
proportionality in the context of the use of force under the right to life, see Philip Alston (Special
Rapporteur), Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, ¶¶ 33–45, U.N. Doc. A/61/311 (Sept. 5,
2006).
327. ECHR, supra note 176, art. 2, ¶ 2.
328. For the scale and effect test in relation to actions by nonstate actors, see Military Aid and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 195 (June
27); see also Stahn, supra note 249, at 45–46. Of course, massive “peacetime” violence against civilians
in the form of genocide or crimes against humanity would fulfill the scale and effects test.
329. Ashraf Sweilam & Brian Rohan, Scores Killed as Militants Attack Egyptian Troops in Sinai,
Associated Press (July 1, 2015, 5:57 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/1b81eb41285047158770af1e3772aaf7/
militants-attack-egyptian-army-checkpoints-sinai-kill-30.
330. These limitations on internal resorts to force are well established in classic theory, namely in
the works of Grotius, Vattel, and Pufendorf. As they posited, not every violation of the contract gives
rise to a right of active, unlimited forcible resistance. The latter is limited by considerations of
necessity and proportionality: the sovereign must present an extreme danger; the danger must be clear
and manifest; and nonviolent means must be unavailable. Even in such cases, forcible action must
abide by means-ends requirement and be justified according to a cost-benefit analysis. The latter has
generally been disregarded in the positive international law of self-defense. Grotius, supra note 47, at
337–38, 346–47, 356–59; Pufendorf, supra note 52, at 716–23; Vattel, supra note 48, ch. XVIII, §§ 287–
90, 292–94.
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Phrased in this manner, we can better conceptualize the three-tiered
approach implied by the ECtHR in Isayeva as setting forth a preliminary
jus ad bellum requirement.
The notions of necessity and proportionality also allow us to
understand better the logic of the “threshold” approach prevalent in
positive international law, which holds that during armed conflict a shift
occurs between the law enforcement and hostilities paradigms. Only
when confronted with a threat amounting to armed hostilities it becomes
possible, in principle, to understand the massive violent response that
characterizes hostilities as a web of actions in self-or-other-defense
against ongoing and imminent threats, and to accordingly understand
IHL as the main normative framework that governs such factual
situations. However, by no means does IHL replace the judgment of the
mere decision to resort to hostilities. As opposed to the “armed conflict”
discourse discussed above, under the suggested construction, the
existence of an armed conflict would not in itself regulate the normative
movement between the paradigms; the latter would be subject only to
the right to life and its exceptions. Understood this way, the relation
between the right to life and IHL becomes parallel to that between the
U.N. Charter’s prohibition on the use of force and IHL. Both realms
regulate different levels of decisionmaking and both apply
simultaneously. If returning to the ICJ’s Nuclear Weapons opinion, when
analyzing the meaning of arbitrary deprivation of life under Article 6(1)
of the ICCPR, we will now ask two questions: first whether the general
decision to resort to hostilities was justified, and second whether this or
that action was lawful under IHL.
C. Application to Nonstate Actors
IHRL is primarily understood as a body of law protecting
331
individuals against states. Therefore, it is not obvious that the right to
life, as enshrined in positive IHRL, applies also to the resort to force by
332
opposition groups—which are essentially groups of individuals. Thus,
in order to make the doctrine suggested here plausible, something must
be said about human rights obligations of nonstate actors. Of course, this
333
issue cannot be fully resolved here, but some preliminary directions can
be offered.
As discussed earlier, there is nothing in international law that
inherently negates subjecting nonstate actors to any field of international

331. Liesbeth Zegveld, Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International Law
38–39 (2002).
332. See id. at 39–46.
333. For a comprehensive exploration see Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of
Non-State Actors (2006); Non-State Actors and Human Rights (Philip Alston ed., 2005).
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law, including IHRL, even if such actors might not be under the
335
jurisdiction of this or that enforcement mechanism. Conceptually, just
as nonstate actors are bound by IHL, although they do not formally enjoy
an international legal personality, they could be bound also by IHRL
336
when they exercise control, in the wide sense, over individuals. This is
especially true considering that the ultimate objective of IHRL is to
protect individuals against any source of arbitrary power, not only power
337
exercised formally by states.
Some recent international practice supports such a view, perhaps
stemming from an emerging customary understanding of human rights law.
For instance, U.N. Special Rapporteur Philip Alston noted, when referring
to the Tamil Tigers (“LTTE”) in Sri Lanka, that
Human rights law affirms that both the [Sri Lankan] Government and
the LTTE must respect the rights of every person in Sri Lanka. Human
rights norms operate on three levels—as the rights of individuals, as
obligations assumed by States, and as legitimate expectations of the
international community. The Government has assumed the binding
legal obligation to respect and ensure the rights recognized in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). As a
non-State actor, the LTTE does not have legal obligations under
ICCPR, but it remains subject to the demand of the international
community, first expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, that every organ of society respect and promote human
338
rights.

It seems that a similar realization is behind recent U.N. Security Council
practice, which refers to the international human rights obligations of all

334. See Yaël Ronen, Human Rights Obligations of Territorial Non-State Actors, 46 Cornell Int’l
L.J. 21, 21 (2013) (noting that there is “nothing in human rights theory that precludes the imposition of
legal obligations on actors other than states”).
335. Id. at 33–35.
336. There is at least the theoretic possibility that control, interpreted widely, is engaged when an
individual is subject to lethal force. Human Rights Commission, General Comment 31: Nature of the
General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant ¶ 10, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (Mar. 29, 2004) [hereinafter General Comment 31]; see also Andreou v.
Turkey, App. No. 45653/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 9–11 (2009). For an analysis of these questions, see Eliav
Lieblich with Owen Alterman, Transnational Asymmetric Armed Conflict Under
International Humanitarian Law: Key Contemporary Challenges 46–51 (2015); see also Ronen,
supra note 334, at 26 (“There is a growing acceptance that any control may give rise to obligations,
whether or not that control is territorial.”); cf. Zegveld, supra note 331, at 54.
337. Robert McCorquodale, Non-State Actors and International Human Rights Law, in Research
Handbook on International Human Rights Law 97, 111–12 (Sarah Joseph & Adam McBeth eds.,
2010); Ronen, supra note 334, at 21 (stating that “[o]ptimally, protection of human rights should . . .
extend to all situations in which these rights are threatened, irrespective of who puts them in
jeopardy”).
338. Philip Alston (Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions),
Mission to Sri Lanka, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/53/Add.5 (Mar. 27, 2006).
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parties to internal armed conflicts, even if not always in specific legal
340
terms.
Nonetheless, despite the hints of practice asserting the application
341
of human rights norms to nonstate actors, a consensus remains elusive.
Yet still, in fact, there is ample doctrinal leeway to bring resorts to force
342
by nonstate actors within the ambit of human rights law. Namely,
human rights law includes a duty not only to respect, but also to act
343
positively to ensure respect for human rights. The duty to ensure
respect stems from the understanding that in practice, human rights can
be violated by private individuals just as by states; its upshot being that
states must exercise due diligence to protect individuals against
344
violations of rights committed by nonstate entities. For all practical
purposes, this means that the right to life, as enshrined in positive IHRL,
applies—albeit indirectly—to acts of opposition groups. Indeed, this
construction might have convoluted results, in which the resort to armed
force by opposition groups, if recognized as a human rights violation,
345
would result in the liability of the “victimized” state itself. Nonetheless,
if in practice the due diligence requirement implies that states must react
against violations of the right to life by nonstate actors, and if when these
violations amount in scale and effects to armed hostilities, a strong
defensive action might be called for, then arguably there is in fact a barrier
imposed by human rights law on resort to hostilities by opposition groups.
Furthermore, even if IHRL might not apply directly to nonstate
actors, it is unclear to what extent this actually spawns significant
339. S.C. Res 2191, pmbl., ¶ 1 (Dec. 17, 2014); S.C. Res 2139, ¶ 2 (Feb. 22, 2014); see also S.C. Res.
1265, pmbl. (Sept. 17, 1999); S.C. Res. 1193, ¶¶ 12, 14 (Aug. 28. 1998).
340. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2165, pmbl. (July 14, 2014) (“Strongly condemning the continuing
widespread violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by the Syrian authorities, as
well as the human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law by armed groups.”)
(emphasis added). But see id. ¶ 1. The tendency to view human rights obligations of nonstate actors as
“societal expectations” rather than law in the strict sense has been evident in the international
community’s attempts to apply human rights standards to corporations. See Ronen, supra note 334, at 24.
341. See Zegveld, supra note 331, at 47–51; see also McCorquodale, supra note 337, at 112–14
(suggesting ways in which human rights law could be made applicable to nonstate actors).
342. For instance, human rights bodies have clarified that actions by private individuals can
amount to “torture.” See Human Rights Committee, Compilation of General Comments and General
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, ¶ 2, at 30, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1
(1994); see also David Kretzmer, The Prohibition on Torture, Max Planck Encyclopedia on Public
International Law ¶ 24 (2010). Similarly, it is must be true that actions by private individuals can
amount to a violation of the right to life.
343. ECHR, supra note 176, art. 1; ICCPR, supra note 93, art. 2(1).
344. General Comment 31, supra note 336, ¶ 8. It seems that Article 17 of the ECHR, supra note
176, goes one step further by stipulating that “[n]othing in this Convention may be interpreted as
implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at
the destruction of any of the rights” protected in the Convention. For a helpful overview, see
McCorquodale, supra note 337, at 104–09.
345. Cf. McCorquodale, supra note 337, at 108–09 (offering ways to ensure greater protection of
human rights regardless of who is violator); Ronen, supra note 334, at 28.
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consequences under positive law, at least in most cases. Let us assume
that opposition group B resorts to force against regime A without a valid
self-defense justification. If B loses the war, then in any case its members
might be punished through the domestic criminal system. Of course,
international law has no objection to such a result, since B violated the
putative prohibition on internal force, which—at least concerning rebel
activity—is mirrored in criminal offenses in most jurisdictions. If,
conversely, B wins, and succeeds either in substantially taking power or
in effecting secession, then B might incur state responsibility for actions it
undertook while still an opposition group, including its unlawful decision
346
to resort to force. The only scenario in which the problem of the
attribution of responsibility remains is where A and B establish a joint
347
government following the cessation of hostilities.
In sum, even if as of now, a formal recognition of the direct
application of IHRL to nonstate actors remains de lege ferenda, it is
348
indeed possible to envision such a regime, whether based on treaty
interpretation or customary law, emanating from recent Security Council
349
practice, or as some recent writing suggests, on models of shared
350
responsibility. What is nonetheless clear is that ultimately, nonstate
actors must respect the right to life, an obligation reflected—albeit
indirectly—in states’ positive duties to protect human rights from
violations by private individuals. Perhaps the realization that nonstate
actors can affect the lives of millions not only by committing atrocities,
but also by deciding to resort to hostilities, might usher a further legal
development in this context.
D. A System of Presumptions
Last, it should be noted that my suggestion for an equal legal
standard to assess resort to force both by states and opposition groups
does not necessarily result in the absolutely identical application of the
standard. Indeed, the problem of internal jus ad bellum is especially
sticky because of the starting point of intrastate relations, as opposed to
that of international relations. Since the latter presume horizontal
“sovereign equality” between states, it is conceptually easier to identify
illegitimate international use of force. This is because when freedom
346. This rule is entrenched in customary international law of state responsibility. See Int’l Law
Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) (providing that acts of
insurrectional movements that become governments or succeeds in establishing a new state become
attributable to the state); see also id. at 50–52.
347. See id. at 51, ¶ 7.
348. See Ronen, supra note 334, at 25–30.
349. Cf. Heffes, supra note 103, at 45–52.
350. See Veronika Bílková, Armed Opposition Groups and Shared Responsibility, 62 Neth. Int’l
L. Rev. 69 (2015); Jean d’Aspremont et al., Sharing Responsibility Between Non-State Actors and
States in International Law: Introduction, 62 Neth. Int’l L. Rev. 49 (2015).
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between states is the baseline, forcible coercion clearly stands out.
Intrastate relations, conversely, presume coercion as a legitimate point of
departure: states differ from one another only by the level of coercion
they employ internally. Identifying just exactly at what point this
coercion, or a challenge to it, amounts to the type of threat that would
justify a forcible response is a complex factual question.
It might be necessary, thus, as a matter of legal technique, to
differentiate between parties through a system of presumptions. For
instance, it could be argued that states are generally more accountable
and possess epistemic advantages, and therefore a factual (rebuttable)
presumption should be made in favor of governments when resorting to
352
armed force. However, the presumption should not be too powerful,
since we might also agree that sovereigns have a special duty of restraint
353
when confronting internal resistance.
Moreover, this presumption can be further “tempered” by several
flexible, fact-intensive considerations in accordance with the
circumstances at hand. For instance, consideration can be given to the
nature of the regime. Arguably, some weight should be given to the
state’s overall human rights record: there is no reason that egregious
violators of human rights would enjoy the exact same presumption as
those that generally respect human rights.
Of course, the exact nature of the presumption should be considered
further. For the purposes of this Article, it suffices to point out that
concerns that we might have regarding the implementation of the
standard suggested here can be addressed by relatively simple legal
techniques at the stage of application.
Conclusion
Given the prevalence of internal armed conflicts and their price in
human life and security, the complex problem of internal resort to force
cannot continue to remain a blind spot of international law. Indeed, the
current doctrinal divergence in which external force is prohibited, while
internal force remains all but unaddressed, is not only a peculiar moment
in the history of international law, but is also incoherent in terms of legal
policy.
Since it is about killing, any legal standard regulating the resort to
hostilities must be structured around the right of self-or-other-defense—
whether on the individual, collective or international levels. In intrastate
351. See, e.g., James N. Rosenau, Intervention as a Scientific Concept, 13 J. Conflict Resol. 149,
163 (1969) (arguing that interstate interventions can be identified by their “convention breaking”
nature).
352. For a comparable use of presumption in favor of governments in the related context of
external assistance, see Lauterpacht, supra note 10, at 233.
353. Cf. Fabre, supra note 6, at 135–48 (discussing the unique devastation caused by civil wars).

Lieblich-67.3.docx (Do Not Delete)

748

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

3/21/2016 10:20 PM

[Vol. 67:687

settings, the natural normative framework for such a prohibition (and its
exceptions) is the right to life, as entrenched in IHRL. Due to the ethical
appeal of revisionist just war theory, this framework must apply equally
to governments as well as to opposition groups.
Nonetheless, the theory suggested here does not assume anarchy, on
the one hand, nor is it conservative, on the other. It leaves space for
second-order adjustments—in the form of factual presumptions—to give
due consideration both to states’ duty to maintain law and order, and to
peoples’ right to shake off oppression. But these considerations do not
amount to a primary recognition that people, when acting through groups
or states, are somehow permitted to kill in situations in which they would
not be allowed to do so as individuals.
All in all, the question of internal resort to force raises a plethora of
problems in ethics, legal theory, doctrine and policy that should be further
addressed. This Article, hopefully, proposes a promising baseline for
discussion.

